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IRS Third-Party Administrative Summonses vs. the
Right to Privacy: The Case of Barter Exchanges
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has the duty to collect taxes
and make inquiries for that purpose.' Pursuant to this duty, the IRS
has the power to issue summonses requiring taxpayers and third par-
ties2 to appear and produce books, papers, records, and documents re-
lating to the business transactions of the taxpayer.3 When these
administrative summonses are both directed to a specified group of
third parties defined in Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code) section
7609(a)(3) and identify the taxpayer whose tax liability is at issue (the
target taxpayer), the section 7609 right to notice and intervention provi-
sions apply to protect the privacy of the target taxpayer.4 However, the
protective notice and intervention provisions of section 7609(a) and (b)
do not apply to a summons that does not identify the target taxpayer.
Instead, special John Doe summons5 requirements must be met before
such a summons can issue.6
Barter exchanges are one recent target of IRS John Doe sum-
monses.7 Newly added to the list of third parties specified in section
7609,8 barter exchanges act as clearinghouses for the exchange of goods
and services among their members.9 Members use trade credits instead
of money as the medium of exchange. Members' accounts are credited
for sales of goods and services and debited for purchases. The barter
exchange often earns a commission on these transactions, which is
credited to its own account. Some barter exchanges also require the
payment of membership fees and dues.'0
1. I.R.C. § 7601 (West Supp. 1983).
2. A third party is the party to whom the summons is issued whose tax liability is not
then under investigation. The person summoned may be any person the Treasury Secretary
deems proper. Id § 7602.
3. Id
4. Id § 7609(a)-(b).
5. Id § 7609(f). A John Doe summons is used by the IRS to investigate the tax liabil-
ity of a taxpayer whose identity is unknown to the IRS.
6. Id.
7. Keller, The Taxation of Barter Transactions, 67 MINN. L. RFv. 441, 487-90 (1982).
8. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3)(G) (West Supp. 1983), as amended by Act of Sept. 3, 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-248, § 311(b), (c)(2), 96 Stat. 601, 620 (effective Jan. 1, 1983, and for summonses
served after Dec. 31, 1982).
9. See generally Keller, supra note 7, at 441-46.
10. United States v. Barter Sys., Inc., 82-I U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9127, at 83,091 (D.
Neb. 1981),rev'don other grounds, 694 F.2d 163, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9698, at 83,515
(8th Cir. 1982) (involving an exchange that charged a 10% fee on each transaction, a one-
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These unique, non-cash transactions may result in reportable in-
come to the taxpayer members.1" Fearing that the barter exchange
members might omit or improperly report such income, the IRS insti-
tuted its Barter Exchange Project Unreported Income Program.' 2 The
purpose of the project is to identify barter exchanges and their mem-
bers and to gather information concerning their barter transactions in
order to audit both the barter exchanges and the members. 13 When
this information is not produced voluntarily, IRS agents are directed to
use John Doe summonses to carry out their investigations. 4
The IRS' use of administrative summonses poses problems for
barter exchange members and other unnamed taxpayer targets. The
provisions of section 7609 were enacted because Congress recognized
that taxpayers have privacy rights warranting protection.' 5 However,
because of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code and certain judi-
cial interpretations of the relevant Code sections, the I.R.C. provides
little, if any, real protection under section 7609 to the unnamed target
taxpayer. When the taxpayer whose tax liability is at issue is not
named in the summons, as with all John Doe summonses, the taxpayer
has no right to intervene and challenge the validity of that summons at
the enforcement proceeding.16 In certain circuits, even the third-party
summonee may not challenge the validity of the summons at the en-
time membership fee, and annual dues); United States v. Coble, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9 9506, at 84,815 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (describing the Greater Iowa Trade Exchange, the subject
of an IRS summons); In re Does, 671 F.2d 977, 978 (6th Cir. 1982) (describing the Colum-
bus Trade Exchange, another subject of an IRS investigation).
11. In re Does, 671 F.2d 977, 978 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Island Trade Exch.,
535 F. Supp. 993, 996 & n.1, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9317, at 83,809 & n.1 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) (sufficient showing by IRS that exchange members may have violated tax laws). See
generally Keller, supra note 7.
12. See United States v. Gottlieb, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9257, at 83,560 (M.D.
Fla. 1982). See also In re Does, 671 F.2d 977, 978 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Island
Trade Exch., 535 F. Supp. 993, 996, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 19317, at 83,811 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) (uniqueness of barter transactions causes taxpayers to omit or improperly report
income).
13. IRS MANUAL SUPPLEMENT (Mar. 11, 1980). See United States v. Gottlieb, 82-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9257, at 83,560 (M.D. Fla. 1982); United States v. Barter Sys., Inc.,
82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 19127, at 83,091 (D. Neb. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 694 F.2d
163, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9698, at 83,515 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Constanti-
nides, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9830, at 85,732 (D. Md. 1980).
14. United States v. Coble, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9506, at 84,819 (S.D. Iowa
1982); United States v. Gottlieb, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9257, at 83,560 (M.D. Fla.
1982); United States v. Barter Sys., Inc., 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9127, at 83,091 (D.
Neb. 1981),rev'don other grounds, 694 F.2d 163, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 19698, at 83,515
(8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Constantinides, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) $ 9830, at 85,733
(D. Md. 1980).
15. See infra note 35.
16. I.R.C. § 7609(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1983).
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forcement proceeding. 17 As a result, the taxpayer is denied all prophy-
lactic relief and is forced to wait until trial to contest the validity of the
summons. In other circuits, the validity of the summons may not even
be challenged at trial,'8 with the result that the validity of the sum-
mons' issuance may never be attacked. Thus, the special John Doe
summons procedures provide only superficial and inadequate protec-
tion of the taxpayers' right to privacy.19
The inclusion of barter exchanges as third-party record keepers
under section 7609 indicates that exchange members should be entitled
to section 7609 notice and intervention protection. Yet the IRS has
been able to circumvent those provisions by maintaining that it is only
investigating the exchange, and any information obtained that could
later be used against the members is a mere byproduct of the investiga-
tion.20 In certain circuits, the IRS has also been able to avoid the John
Doe summons requirements with this same rationale, thus depriving
the exchange members of all protection under the Code.21 Even in cir-
cuits requiring the IRS to use the John Doe summons procedure, the
taxpayer is left without any real protection of his or her privacy
interests.
An additional problem arises when the required records doctrine22
is applied to the records that the barter exchange may now be re-
quested to keep as a third-party recordkeeper. When the doctrine is
applied, the taxpayer will be denied all fourth amendment protection.23
Even though the section 7609 procedures were enacted as a substitute
for the traditional protection of the fourth amendment search warrant
requirements,24 they fail to achieve this purpose. In those circuits
where the validity of the issuance of the John Doe summons can never
be contested, where neither John Doe summons procedures nor section
7609 notice and intervention procedures are enforced, and where the
required records doctrine is applied, the target taxpayer receives no
protection of his or her privacy interests.
All that remains to protect the target taxpayer from IRS "fishing
expeditions" into his or her affairs and business transactions are the
judicial limitations imposed on the use of these summonses by the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Powell.25 Yet even
this protection is not sufficient because the standards that must be met
17. See infra note 77 & accompanying text.
18. See infra note 78 & accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 70-79 & accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 94-95 & accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 87-107 & accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 120-122 & accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 115-163 & accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 80-81 & accompanying text.
25. 379 U.S. 48 (1964). Powell is discussed infra notes 52-69 & accompanying text.
September 1983] IRS ADMINISTRATIVE SUMMONSES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
under the Powell restrictions are far from rigorous. 26
Under the Code the unnamed target taxpayers also may not inter-
vene to protect their fifth amendment rights. This creates an additional
problem for barter exchange members. Because the fifth amendment
may not be asserted vicariously, the third-party barter exchange may
not assert its members' rights. In addition, it is difficult for the ex-
change to show that it, as an entity, is entitled to its own fifth amend-
ment protection. Furthermore, the member has the difficult task at trial
of showing that he or she is entitled to his or her own fifth amendment
rights if the summoned material is in the possession of the exchange
rather than in his own possession. Should this effort fail, there is no
fifth amendment protection against the IRS' use of its administrative
summonses.
27
This Note examines the power of the IRS under the Internal Reve-
nue Code as amended in 1982 as well as the judicial limitations im-
posed on that power in United States v. Powell and subsequent cases.
The Note focuses on how the IRS uses its summons power to investi-
gate the tax liability of barter exchanges and their members, and how
the fourth and fifth amendment rights of barter exchanges and their
members are affected by these IRS practices. Finally, this Note pro-
poses solutions to the problems outlined above that will reconcile the
conflicting goals of protecting taxpayers' privacy interests and permit-
ting the IRS to perform its duty of collecting taxes.2 8
The Power of the IRS Under the Internal Revenue Code
The IRS has the power to make inquiries, to examine books, pa-
pers, records, and other data relevant to such inquiries, and to issue
summonses requiring a person liable for tax, or any third person the
Treasury Secretary deems proper, to produce such material and testify
under oath.29 The power to conduct such investigations and issue ad-
ministrative summonses may be exercised only for the specific purposes
of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return when
none has been made, determining liability for any internal revenue tax,
or collecting such tax.30 In addition, under the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),31 the IRS may make inquiries
26. See infra notes 54,62, 65 & accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 164-205 & accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 223-230 & accompanying text.
29. I.R.C. §§ 7601, 7602 (West Supp. 1983). See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S.
517, 523-24 (1970). The summons is sufficient if the books, papers, records, or other data are
described with reasonable certainty. I.R.C. § 7603 (West Supp. 1983).
30. I.R.C. § 7602(a) (West Supp. 1983).
31. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-
248, §§ 31 1(c)(2), 331(e), 332(b), 333(b), 96 Stat. 601, 620-21 (1982) (effective Jan. 1, 1983,
and for summonses issued after Dec. 31, 1982).
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and examine data for the broader purpose of "inquiring into any of-
fense connected with the administration or enforcement of the Internal
Revenue Laws."'3 2 Under the Code, the IRS also has the power to seek
judicial enforcement of its summonses. 33
Before 1976, there was no legal requirement that the taxpayer or
party to whose business or affairs the summoned records related be no-
tified that an administrative summons had been served on a third party.
In 1976, however, Congress enacted I.R.C. section 760934 for the pur-
pose of giving notice to taxpayers that their tax status was under inves-
tigation. This notice enables the taxpayer to raise available legal
defenses in protection of his or her right to privacy.35 Section 7609(a)
provides that if a summons requiring production of records of a tax-
payer who is identified in the summons is served on a "third-party rec-
ord keeper,"' 36 notice of the summons must be given to the person so
identified.37 The taxpayer entitled to such notice has the right to inter-
32. I.R.C. § 7602(b) (West Supp. 1983).
33. Id § 7604(b). The date set for appearance before the Secretary must not be less
than 10 days from the date of the summons. No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary
examinations or investigations or more than one inspection of his books per year unless he
requests otherwise or the Secretary notifies him in writing that such inspection is necessary.
Id § 7605(a)-(b).
34. Act of Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1205(a), 90 Stat. 1699, 1699 (1976). The
new section was effective for any summonses issued after Feb. 28, 1977. Id § 1205(c), 90
Stat. at 1701.
35. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 373, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3439, 3797-98; H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 307, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3203 [hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE REPORT with page
references to reprint in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws]. The Senate Finance Commit-
tee noted that while the administrative summons, including the third-party summons, is a
necessary IRS tool, its use should not unreasonably infringe on the taxpayer's civil rights,
including the right to privacy. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, at 3797. A problem of infringe-
ment arises with a third-party summons because a third party typically has much less inter-
est in protecting the summoned records than does the target of the investigation. The
Committee believed protection of privacy would be afforded if the parties to whom the
records pertained were given notice of the issuance of the third-party summons and were
afforded a "reasonable and speedy means to challenge the summons where appropriate."
Id. at 3798. A copy of the noticee-taxpayer's rights was to be sent so the taxpayer would not
lose his right to challenge the summons through inadvertance or ignorance of his rights. Id.
at 3799. Yet the purpose of the notice, as the Committee envisioned it, was only to permit
the noticee to raise available defenses, not to expand his substantive rights. Id. at 3799-800.
36. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3) (West Supp. 1983). A third-party recordkeeper is defined as a
bank, credit union, consumer reporting agency, person extending credit through the use of
credit cards, attorney, accountant, or broker. Under TEFRA, barter exchanges were added
to the list of third-party recordkeepers.
37. Under the prior law, notice was to be given within three days of the day service is
made, but no later than the fourteenth day before the fixed date for examination of the
records. Id § 7609(a)(1)(B) (1976). Under TEFRA, notice must now be sent to any such
taxpayer identified in the summons within three days of the day on which the summons was
served on the third-party recordkeeper, but no later than the twenty-third day before the day
set in the summons to examine the records. The notice is to be accompanied by a copy of
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vene in the section 7604 proceeding enforcing the summons, and the
right to begin a proceeding to quash the summons under section
7609(b).38
A significant exception to the section 7609 notice requirement ex-
ists when the IRS uses its administrative summons power to gather in-
formation about unidentified taxpayers from third parties.39 These
John Doe summonses were also unrestrained by statute before 1976.40
The John Doe summons is used when the IRS knows of a particular
transaction that may affect someone's tax liability, but does not know
the identity of the person involved. In these cases, compliance with the
the summons and an explanation of the right under subsection (b)(2) to bring a proceeding
to quash. Id § 7609(a)(1). Notice may be sent to the last known address of the person
entitled to notice or, if none is known, left with the person summoned, or mailed to the last
known address of a known fiduciary of the person entitled to notice. Id § 7609(a)(2). The
summons must identify the taxpayer to whom it relates or the other person to whom the
records pertain. Id § 7609(a)(5).
38. Id § 7609(a)-(b), (d). TEFRA changed the procedures by which a taxpayer may
challenge an administrative summons issued by the IRS to a third-party recordkeeper.
Before TEFRA, the taxpayer was permitted to stay compliance with the summons by giving
written notice to the recordkeeper not to comply and by sending a copy thereof to the IRS
within 14 days of receiving notice. Id § 7609(b)(l)-(2) (1976). No examination of any sum-
moned records was to be made before the expiration of the 14-day period or when compli-
ance had been stayed under § 7609(b)(2), except by order of the court or consent of the
person staying compliance. Id § 7609(d) (1976). The IRS could then institute proceedings
under § 7604 to enforce compliance with the summons. See generally Wesley, Recent Devel-
opments Involving Administrative Summonses, 1 S. ILL. L.J. 41 (1982) (discussion of the pro-
visions of § 7609 prior to the enactment of TEFRA).
TEFRA has made it more difficult for the taxpayer to stay compliance with the sum-
mons. Under TEFRA, the taxpayer must institute a civil action to quash the summons not
later than the twentieth day after the day notice of summons is given in compliance with
I.R.C. § 7609(a)(2) (West Supp. 1983). In any such action, the IRS may seek to compel
compliance with the summons. Within this 20-day period, the taxpayer must also mail a
copy of the petition to quash to both the recordkeeper and the Secretary. The recordkeeper
has the right to intervene in this proceeding to quash, but is bound by the court's decision
whether or not it intervenes. No examination of the summoned records is permitted before
the twenty-third day after notice of the summons is given, unless the taxpayer consents or
the court so orders and a proceeding to quash has begun. Id § 7609(b).
39. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(4) (West Supp. 1983). In addition, § 7609 does not apply to a sum-
mons to determine the identity of any person having a numbered account with a bank or
similar institution. Id. § 7609(c)(2)(A). Nor does it apply to a summons in aid of the collec-
tion of the liability of a person (his transferee or fiduciary) against whom an assessment has
been made or judgment rendered. Id. § 7609(c)(2)(B). Notice is not required and there is
no right to intervene and stay compliance if the Secretary has reasonable cause to believe
that notice may: lead to attempts to conceal, destroy, or alter relevant records; prevent com-
munication of information from other persons through intimidation, bribery, or collusion; or
cause the taxpayer to flee to avoid prosecution, testifying, or production of records. Id
§ 7609(g). No notice is required to determine whether business records of an identified per-
son have been kept. Id § 7609(a)(4)(B). Finally, no notice is required when the person
summoned is not one of the defined third-party recordkeepers. Id § 7609(a)(1)(A).
40. In re Tax Liabilities of John Does, 541 F. Supp. 213, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9369, at 84,008 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
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notice rules was deemed impossible.41 Thus, section 7609 was struc-
tured so that when the taxpayer is not named in the summons, the pro-
tective notice provisions do not apply; when no notice is required, there
is neither the right to intervene nor the right to bring a proceeding to
quash the summons.42
However, an unidentified taxpayer does receive some protection
under sections 7609(f) and (h). These subsections were enacted specifi-
cally to protect the privacy rights of taxpayers unnamed in third-party
summonses. 43 Under sections 7609(f) and (h), a John Doe summons
may not be issued absent a showing by the Secretary in an ex parte
proceeding that three requirements have been met.44 First, the sum-
mons must relate to the investigation of a particular person or ascer-
tainable group or class of persons.45 Second, there must be a
reasonable basis for believing the person, group or class may fail or
41. COMMI-"EE REPORT, supra note 35, at 3801. However, it is difficult to understand
why notice of a John Doe summons could not be transmitted through the third-party sum-
monee (recordkeeper) as is allowed under I.R.C. § 7609(a) when the identity of the taxpayer
is known to the IRS. Presumably the recordkeeper would know whom its records concerned
and the IRS could require it to transmit such notice. The taxpayer would then be entitled to
intervene and stay compliance in order to protect his privacy right. See supra note 37.
42. I.R.C. § 7609(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1983). See United States v. South Cent. Bell Tel.
Co., 79-I U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9291, at 86,649 (M.D. Tenn. 1979).
43. In United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1974), the IRS was held to have the
power under §§ 7601 and 7602 to issue a John Doe summons to a bank to determine the
possible tax liability of an unidentified depositor. In Bisceglia, $40,000 in decrepit $100 bills
that had been deposited with a Kentucky bank over a 10-day period had to be sent to the
Federal Reserve as unfit for circulation. This fact alone caused the IRS to suspect unre-
ported transactions involving the bills. The Court enforced a summons for the production
of certain bank records to identify the taxpayer. The Court stated that the IRS has a legiti-
mate interest in large or unusual financial transactions, especially those involving cash, and
that these circumstances were extraordinary. Id. at 149-50. Justices Blackmun and Powell
concurred, emphasizing that there was "an overwhelming probability, if not a certitude"
that one individual was responsible, that the summons was not exploratory but issued pursu-
ant to "a genuine investigation," and that the service was not "researching some general
problem." Id. at 151-52. Furthermore, this was not a case in which neither a particular
taxpayer nor ascertainable group was under investigation. Id. at 152 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring).
The Supreme Court's decision in Bisceglia led Congress to enact subsections (f) and (h)
of I.R.C. § 7609 as a further protection of the taxpayer's right to privacy. See In re Tax
Liabilities of John Does, 541 F. Supp. 213, 217, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) T 9369, at 84,008
(N.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Maxwell, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9378, at 87,027 (D.
Nev. 1981). Congress realized that the John Doe summons interfered with the right to pri-
vacy of the unnamed taxpayer, but also noted that in some instances, the John Doe sum-
mons is the only practical means by which the IRS can fulfill its duty to investigate
suspicious circumstances. CoMMiTrEE REPORT, supra note 35, at 3801-02.
44. I.R.C. § 7609(f) (West Supp. 1983). See also United States v. Mobil Corp., 82-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9242, at 83,507-08 (N.D. Tex. 1982). This is the means by which the
congressional committee intended to protect the privacy of the unidentified taxpayer, whom
the committee believed could not be notified. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 35, at 3797.
45. I.R.C. § 7609(f)(1) (West Supp. 1983). See also In re Oil & Gas Producers, 500 F.
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may have failed to comply with any provision of the I.R.C.46 Finally,
the information sought to be obtained from the records (including the
identity of the person(s) whose tax liability is under investigation) must
not be readily available from other sources.47
Sections 7609(f) and (h) gave statutory recognition to John Doe
summonses, but also limited their use.48 Consistent with the tradition
that administrative summonses are not to be used for merely explora-
tory searches, open-ended John Doe summonses are not permissible.49
Instead, the IRS must present specific facts concerning a specific situa-
tion before a court will approve the summons.50 Yet the IRS need not
show conclusive evidence of a tax violation to meet this standard. In-
stead, it must present evidence that a transaction has or may have oc-
curred which, in light of the facts known to the IRS, is reasonably
suggestive of the possibility that the correct tax liability may not have
been or might not be reported.5'
Supp. 440,441 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (all persons having oil and gas processing agreements with
the summonee were an ascertainable group).
46. I.R.C. § 7609(f)(2) (West Supp. 1983). See also In re Oil and Gas Producers, 500 F.
Supp. 440, 443-44 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (The court stated that "the John Doe summons proce-
dure did not authorize the IRS to force private citizens to do its research." The summons
sought information about parties who had done business with the summonee. The IRS did
not suspect tax violations with respect to those transactions but thought that parties other
than the summonee might have committed violations in other transactions. The court held
that the summons was "fatally overbroad" and an "impermissible fishing expedition."). But
see United States v. Brigham Young Univ., 679 F. 2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982) (the fact that
charitable contributions to Brigham Young University were overvalued in 162 individual
tax returns was a reasonable basis for the IRS' belief that some of the 150 other persons
making charitable gifts to the University may have overvalued their gifts).
47. I.R.C. § 7609()(3) (West Supp. 1983). See also In re Oil & Gas Producers, 500 F.
Supp. 440, 442 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (the requirement is deemed met when the information
sought is more readily available from the summoned taxpayer, despite alternative sources);
United States v. Hayes, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9627, at 88,085-86 (D. Ga. 1982) (the
IRS could not retrieve the information without unwarranted delay, unreasonable burden or
expense).
48. In re Tax Liabilities of John Does, 541 F. Supp. 213, 217, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9369, at 84,008 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Oil & Gas Producers, 500 F. Supp. 440, 443
(W.D. Okla. 1980) ("Both the Constitution and the Congress, in this statutory procedure,
have placed the federal courts between the government and the person summoned to protect
against the abusive use of governmental powers.").
49. United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 754-55 (4th Cir. 1973); Mays v. Davis, 7
F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Pa. 1934). Accord United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150 (1974).
See also Tillotson v. Bougner, 333 F.2d 515, 516 (7th Cir. 1964) (the court enforced the
summons and distinguished Mfays v. Davis, in which a "fishing expedition" took place).
50. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 35, at 3802; In re Purchasers of Master Recordings
from Bowman Record & Prod. Co., 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9448, at 84,230-31 (N.D.
Ga. 1980).
51. In re Tax Liabilities of John Does, 541 F. Supp. 213, 218, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9369, at 84,008-09 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (Congress' intent was merely to prevent admin-
istrative abuse by the IRS). See also In re Does, 671 F.2d 977, 980 (6th Cir. 1982); In re
Purchasers of Master Recordings from Bowman Record & Prod. Co., 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
[Vol. 35
Judicial Limitations on IRS Summons Power
Certain judicial standards must be met in order to enforce any ad-
ministrative summons. These standards were set forth by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Powell.52 In contrast to the requirement for
issuing a search warrant,5 3 the Powell Court held that the government
need not meet any standard of probable cause in order to obtain en-
forcement of a section 7602 summons.5 4 Instead, four requirements
must be met in good faith: the investigation must be conducted pursu-
ant to a legitimate purpose; the Commissioner must show that the in-
quiry may be relevant to that purpose; the information sought must not
already be in the Commissioner's possession; and, the administrative
steps required by the Code must have been followed.5 5 These require-
ments, however, are not exclusive. The court may impose other re-
quirements to prevent abuse of its process.5 6
(CCH) 9448, at 84,231-32 (N.D. Ga. 1980). This standard bears a striking resemblence to
the toothless "rational basis test" and does not appear to afford the taxpayer much
protection.
52. 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964).
53. Under the fourth amendment, a search warrant may not issue absent a showing
before a neutral magistrate of probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. Dow v.
Baird, 389 F.2d 882, 884 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Wroblewski, 105 F.2d 444, 446
(7th Cir. 1959). Probable cause to search exists only when the officers have a reasonable
belief that the law has been violated, that property related to the violation exists and may be
found in a certain place, and that the property can be unmistakeably identified, and thus
described with particularity in the warrant. See Lowrey v. United States, 161 F.2d 30, 33
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947). The warrant must describe with particularity the
premises and items to be seized. The particularity requirement defines and limits the scope
of the search and seizure, protecting the individual and preventing "the vicious practice of
using warrants for a general search and seizure." United States v. Wroblewski, 105 F.2d at
446-47. "Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge
or magistrate areper se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment--subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 363
(8th Cir. 1971) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
However, a formal judicial warrant is not required in all administrative searches if the
statutory enforcement procedures contain roughly equivalent safeguards. If the statute pro-
vides for resort to the court prior to an inspection, the inspection provisions themselves will
not violate the fourth amendment. The court must then decide whether the specific search is
reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. United States v. Mississippi
Power & Light, 638 F.2d 899, 907 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
54. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 51, 57.
55. Id. at 58.
56. Id. See also United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 317 n.19, 318 n.20
(1977); United States v. Wyatt, 637 F.2d 293, 301 (5th Cir. 1981). The IRS has the initial
burden of showing that it has met all four Powell requirements. United States v. Kis, 658
F.2d 526, 536, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCII) 9659, at 88,188 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub
nom. Salkin v. United States, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982). This showing establishes a prima facie
case for good faith enforcement of the summons. Id. The burden then shifts to the taxpayer
either to rebut the prima facie case by showing that the Powell requirements have not been
met, or to assert that enforcement of the summons would constitute an abuse of the court's
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The Legitimate Purpose Requirement
Under the first Powell requirement, an investigation by the IRS
must be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose. The only legiti-
mate purposes of IRS investigations are those enunciated in section
7602(b). 57 A summons may not be issued to harass a taxpayer or pres-
sure the taxpayer to settle a collateral dispute.58 It may not be used for
"fishing expeditions" that would enable the IRS to become an informa-
tion-gathering agency for other departments such as the Department of
Justice.5 9 Moreover, a summons may not be used solely for the pur-
process. Id. at 540, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 88,190. An abuse of process would occur if
the summons were issued: solely for harassment or to put presure on the taxpayer to settle a
collateral dispute; solely for criminal prosecution; in contravention of the attorney-client
privilege or the privilege against self-incrimination; or for any purpose other than one in
"good faith." United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 58; United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d at 543
n.36, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 88,190 n.36. It is a heavy burden and is not met merely
by denying the existence of the Powell elements; nor is it met by asserting that the running of
the statute of limitations or a second examination of the summoned records is an abuse of
process. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 58; United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d at 543-44, 81-
2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 88,190-94. The taxpayer must show by a preponderance of the
evidence some improper use of the summons by the IRS. United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d at
543-44, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 88,192. Though the burden is heavy, the court will not
abandon the inquiry into the IRS' good faith. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437
U.S. 298, 316 (1977).
57. See supra notes 30-33 & accompanying text.
58. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 58.
59. The courts and Congress have long been concerned with the problem of IRS ex-
ploratory investigations that amount to "fishing expeditions." See, e.g., Mays v. Davis, 7 F.
Supp. 596 (W.D. Pa. 1934); In re International Corp., 5 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). In
defining a "fishing expedition," the Second Circuit stated that a "search is 'unreasonable'
only because it is out of proportion to the end sought, as when the person served is required
to fetch all his books at once to an exploratory investigation whose purposes and limits can
be determined only as it proceeds." McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1937).
While probable cause to search is not required under Powell, such fishing trips into the
private affairs of taxpayers by the IRS do not fall within the four legitimate purposes of
I.R.C. § 7602. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 316 n.18 (1977). Accord
United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973). Section 7602 was not meant to
permit the IRS to go on a "fishing expedition" or "rambling exploration" through a third
person's files. Id. at 754-55. The government may use its John Doe summons power only
when particularly suspicious circumstances, such as those in Bisceglia, suggest the likelihood
of unpaid taxes. See United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1974). In such cases,
the government may have been "specifically licensed to fish by § 7602." United States v.
Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 568, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) j 9124, at 82,570 (8th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970). Yet the IRS may not engage in "fishing expeditions" in
either its investigations or its research projects as this would "eviscerate judicial constraints
upon the summons power and raise serious constitutional questions." United States v. Har-
rington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1968). See also United States v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co.,
346 F. Supp. 944, 946 (1972). But see United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 635 F.2d 391, 395-96
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981) ("IRS may issue a summons for research as long
as it is issued in good faith upon a § 7602 purpose" in an investigation of a specific taxpayer
or in an ongoing particularized investigation.) (emphasis added); United States v. Flagg, 634
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pose of gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution. 60
F.2d 1087, 1092 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 909 (1981) (IRS has the authority to
issue a summons to an identified taxpayer to develop research data).
60. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 314, 317 (1977); Donaldson
v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 533 (1970). Before TEFRA, the courts had to determine at
what point an IRS investigation became solely a criminal investigation and the use of a
summons impermissible. Tax fraud investigations have both civil and criminal components.
While the civil and criminal components begin to diverge at the point the IRS recommends
criminal prosecution, both elements still exist. Beyond this point, the twin dangers of ex-
tending the Justice Department's right to criminal litigation discovery and usurping the role
of the grand jury would arise. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. at 309-12. In
Donaldson, the Supreme Court held that a summons is permissible if it is issued in good
faith before a recommendation for criminal prosecution. The Court believed that to draw
the line as early as the point when the special agent joined the investigation would "stultify
the enforcement of federal law." Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. at 535-36.
The Court drew its line more clearly in LaSalle, holding that when the IRS in an insti-
tutional sense abandoned the pursuit of civil tax determination or collection, and committed
itself to make a recommendation to the Justice Department, it could not use the § 7602
summons. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. at 316, 318. The taxpayer must
show that the IRS is not engaged in a civil investigation. United States v. Security Bank &
Trust Co., 661 F.2d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 1981). When an institutional commitment to make
the referral exists, a delay in recommendation to the Justice Department in order to gather
more information will not be tolerated. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. at
315-17. However, a summons will not be denied because information derived from a civil
investigation might eventually lead to criminal prosecution. United States v. South Windsor
Bank & Trust Co., 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9430, at 84,176, 84,178 (D. Conn. 1978).
TEFRA's § 7602(c) pushed the line even further than did the LaSalle Court. This sub-
section provides that a § 7602 summons may not be issued and enforcement proceedings
may not be commenced with respect to any person if a Justice Department referral is already
in effect.
This change under TEFRA, as well as the change under § 7609(b) forcing the taxpayer
to bring a motion to quash (rather than requiring the IRS to initiate the enforcement pro-
ceeding), had a collateral practical effect on the taxpayer's use of discovery. Before TEFRA,
discovery was a major reason for staying compliance with the summons. Discovery allowed
the taxpayer to determine whether the IRS had an "institutional purpose" for making the
referral. United States v. Genser, 595 F.2d 146, 152 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 928
(1979) (setting forth guidelines for discovery); United States v. Southwest First Nat'l Bank,
81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9666, at 88,239, 88,244 (5th Cir. 1981) (heavy burden on tax-
payer to prove IRS in an institutional sense abandoned pursuit of civil tax collection);
United States v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9394, at 84,096
(W.D. Mich. 1982) (following Genser). Accord United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845,
853, 875 (5th Cir. 1980) (further discovery limited if taxpayer cannot prove improper pur-
pose); United States v. Will, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9216, at 83,413-16 (Ct. Cl. 1982)
(no unqualified right to pretrial discovery in summons enforcement proceeding; discovery
denied where no showing of substantial abuse by IRS).
Before TEFRA, the right to discovery in enforcement proceedings was severely limited
to investigating the purpose of the IRS. With TEFRA, the issue is no longer whether the
IRS had an institutional purpose for making a referral, but rather whether the referral is in
effect. I.R.C. § 7602(c) (West Supp. 1983). Thus, it is questionable whether any discovery
will now be granted.
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The Relevancy Requirement
Under the second Powell requirement, the IRS must show that the
inquiry may be relevant to the legitimate purpose of the investigation.
The test for relevance, based on reasonableness, is whether the records
sought in the investigation might throw light upon the correctness of
the taxpayer's return.6' While the threshold of relevance is a low one,
it is not nonexistent. 62 Unless the finding of relevance is made, the
demands of the IRS are not considered reasonable and, if enforced,
would violate the right to privacy.63
The Requirement of Nonpossession of Information Sought
Under the third Powell requirement, the IRS must show either that
it does not possess the information sought or that it has no practical
way of obtaining the information.64 This requirement has been
deemed a mere "gloss" on the section 7605(b) prohibition against un-
necessary examination of taxpayers. 65 In United States v. Davis,66 the
court considered the necessity of balancing the IRS' need for "effective
61. Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 186-87 (2d Cir. 1958). See also United States
v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1968) (in balancing the need of the IRS to investi-
gate against the privacy interest of the individual, the court found the standard to be neither
clear and unequivocal proof of relevance nor some chance or possibility; there must be a
"realistic expectation rather than an idle hope that something may be discovered"). See also
United States v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 642 F.2d 388, 390 (10th Cir. 1981) (the test is
not whether all relevant purposes would be served without disclosing the records but
whether there is "some realistic expectation that they may illuminate the accuracy or inaccu-
racy of the taxpayer's return").
62. United States v. Goldman, 637 F.2d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Kis,
658 F.2d 526, 537, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9659, at 88,189 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied
sub noma. Salkin v. United States, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982) (the government's affidavits attesting
that the summoned materials were relevant were sufficient); United States v. Matras, 487
F.2d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1973) (relevance encompasses more than convenience on the part
of the IRS and the IRS does not meet its burden of proving a sufficient nexus between the
investigation and the information sought by alleging a general need for a "road map");
United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 950 (D. Colo. 1975) (IRS is held to
an even higher standard of relevance when it seeks records of the thoughts, theories, and
ideas of the taxpayer rather than records of the taxpayer's potentially taxable transactions;
when the evidence sought is not inherently relevant, the fact that the evidence might shed
light on some unidentified area of tax liability was insufficient to meet the Powell relevance
requirement).
63. Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 240 F.2d 387, 391-93 (9th Cir.
1956). The IRS must satisfy the court that it may actually need the information sought.
Otherwise it is assuming "inquisitorial powers" in excess of those conferred by the statute.
Id. at 390 (citing Martin, Int'l Revenue Agent v. Chandis Sec. Co., 33 F. Supp. 478, 480
(S.D. Cal. 1940)).
64. United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 755 (4th Cir. 1973).
65. United States v. Davis, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9193, at 86,337, 86,342 (5th Cir.
1981).
66. Id. at 86,337.
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investigation against the potential for unnecessary harassment inherent
in summonses. ' 67 The court stated:
[w]hen the summons as a whole is not harassing, when the bulk of
the materials summoned is not demonstrably in the possession of the
IRS, and where the marginal burden of supplying information which
might already be in the possession of the IRS is small. . . enforce-
ment of the summons in its entirety is not an "unnecessary examina-
tion or inspection" within the meaning of § 7605(b). 6 8
The Administrative Steps Requirement
The administrative steps that must be followed under the fourth
Powell requirement include the third-party administrative summons
and special John Doe summons provisions set forth in I.R.C. sections
7601 through 7609.69
Enforcement of Third-Party Administrative Summonses
To enforce a third-party adminstrative summons, the four Powell
requirements must be met, including the provision that the administra-
tive steps set forth in the I.R.C. have been followed.70 Thus, the IRS
must comply with I.R.C. sections 7609 (a) through (e), and (g), when
issuing a third-party administrative summons. When the taxpayer is
not named, the IRS must comply with the special John Doe summons
requirements under I.R.C. section 7609(f). 7 1
Courts are in conflict, however, as to whether the validity of the
issuance of the John Doe summonses may be challenged in an enforce-
67. Id. at 86,343.
68. Id. Affidavits by the IRS that deny it possessed the information sought are suffi-
cient to shift the burden to the summonee of proving actual possession by the IRS. See also
United States v. Groos Nat'l Bank, 661 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that when sum-
monses did not harass, when most of the materials were not in the IRS possession, and when
supplying information would not be burdensome, the good faith test is met). But see United
States v. Bank of Cal., 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9837, at 85,777 (9th Cir. 1980) (enforce-
ment of § 7602 summons was denied for failure to meet the Powell requirement of lack of
possession; difficulty of retrieval and expense was not sufficient to avoid this requirement).
69. See supra notes 31-38.
70. See In re Tax Liabilities of John Does, 541 F. Supp. 213, 217, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9369, at 84,009 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Barter Sys., Inc., 82-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 9127, at 83,092 (D. Neb. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 694 F.2d 163, 82-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 9698, at 83,515 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Constantinides, 80-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 9830, at 85,732-34 (D. Md. 1980); United States v. Reprints, Inc., 79-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9108, at 86,024 (N.D. Ga. 1979). See also supra notes 52-69 &
accompanying text.
71. The latter is true regardless of whether or not the third-party is a third-party
recordkeeper. I.R.C. § 7609(a) and (f) are distinct provisions. See I.R.C. § 7609(a)(4)(C)
(West Supp. 1983); United States v. Mobil Corp., 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9242, at
83,500, 83,507-08 & n.7 (N.D. Tex 1981); see also United States v. Gottlieb, 82-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 9257, at 83,560 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
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ment proceeding.72 This presents a serious problem for the unnamed
target taxpayer in the John Doe summons. The taxpayer may not in-
tervene as of right in the enforcement proceeding simply because his or
her tax liability is the subject of the summons.73
I.R.C. section 7609 provides some relief to the named taxpayer by
giving her notice and allowing her to begin a proceeding to quash the
summons and to intervene as of right. However, this notice require-
ment applies only when the taxpayer is named in the summons74 and
when the summonee is one of the enumerated third-party
recordkeepers under section 7609(b). 75 Furthermore, the courts have
denied both named and unnamed taxpayers permissive intervention
under rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.76 Thus, the
Code is structured so that the unnamed taxpayer target of the John Doe
summons cannot intervene in the enforcement proceeding to protect
her privacy interests.
Whether the third-party summonee rather than the taxpayer may
challenge the validity of the issuance of the summons at the enforce-
ment proceeding is an open question.77 If the third-party is not permit-
72. See infra note 77 & accompanying text.
73. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 530 (1970).
74. See Kirschenbaum v. Beerman, 376 F. Supp. 388, 399 (W.D. Pa. 1974); see also
I.R.C. § 7609(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1983).
75. See United States v. Gartland, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 148, 149-50, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9604, at 84,928-29 (D. Md. 1980); see also United States v. Shivlock, 459 F. Supp.
1383, 1385, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9186, at 86,304 (D. Colo. 1978), aft'd, 612 F.2d 1224
(10th Cir. 1979) (Congress' underlying concern in enacting § 7609 was the protection of the
privacy interests of the taxpayer in his or her personal and business transactions. However,
the intervention limitation that the summonee be a § 7609(b) third-party recordkeeper was
imposed to prevent diminution or frustration of the IRS investigatory powers.). See also
United States v. White Agency, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9265, at 86,552, 86,553 (W.D.
Mich. 1979); United States v. Exxon, 450 F. Supp. 472, 476, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9537, at 84,652-53 (D. Md. 1978).
76. For the same reasons that intervention as of right is limited, permissive intervention
is denied. United States v. Exxon, 450 F. Supp. 472, 476-77, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1
9537, at 84,656-57 (D. Md. 1978); United States v. Gartland, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 148, 150, 78-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9604, at 84,929 (D. Md. 1978). See also United States v. Newman,
441 F.2d 165, 172, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9329, at 86,259 (5th Cir. 1971) (rejecting
permissive intervention).
77. Some courts view the three issuance requirements as "merely a condition prece-
dent" to issuance of the summons and not as a proper ground for contesting the enforcement
of the summons. United States v. Coble, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9506, at 84,817 (S.D.
Iowa 1982); In reTax Liabilities of John Does, 541 F. Supp. 213, 216-17, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9369, at 84,008-09 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Hayes, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9627, at 88,085 (D. Ga. 1981); In re Purchasers of Master Recordings from Bow-
man Record & Prod. Co., 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9448, at 84,231 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
Other courts citing Powell have held that the summonees may challenge the summons on
any appropriate ground. United States v. Island Trade Exch., 535 F. Supp. 993, 996, 82-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9317, at 83,810 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (respondents could challenge the
IRS showing that the John Doe summons issuance requirement had been met as a means to
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ted to do so, no one may assert this challenge at the enforcement
proceeding, and the taxpayer target is forced to wait until trial to chal-
lenge the validity of the issuance of the John Doe summons. Yet the
courts are divided as to whether the target taxpayer may raise such a
challenge at trial or suppress any evidence obtained through the sum-
mons.78 Hence, if those circuits that do not permit the taxpayer to raise
this challenge at trial also follow the line of decisions that do not permit
this challenge to be made at the enforcement proceeding, the validity of
the issuance of the John Doe summons may never be contested in those
circuits. Thus, the requirements for the issuance of the summons,
which provide the taxpayer's sole protection in the John Doe situation,
in practice offer little, if any, protection.7 9
prove the fourth Powell requirement had not been met); United States v. Pittsburgh Trade
Exch., 644 F.2d 302, 304-05 (3d Cir. 1981) (subsequent to ex parte proceeding authorizing
issuance of John Does summons, district court retains the authority to conduct an eviden-
tiary hearing in subpoena enforcement proceeding).
78. See United States v. Schutterle, 586 F.2d 1201, 1203 (8th Cir. 1978) (noting that this
split among the circuit courts exists and assuming that the taxpayer could challenge the
validity of the issuance at trial). In United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1978), the
issue was "whether or not a taxpayer has standing to attack the validity of an I.R.C. § 7602
summons issued to third parties who voluntarily complied and to have the fruits of an im-
proper summons excluded from evidence." Id. at 300. The court held that the taxpayer has
standing to challenge the validity of a third-party summons at either the investigatory stage
or the trial level. Id. at 306. The taxpayer's standing was derived from I.R.C. § 7602 under
which the taxpayer has a protectible interest in preventing the IRS from using these sum-
monses as "criminal investigatory tools." Id. at 305-06. The court noted that even when
there is no fourth amendment issue, the taxpayer may assert a claim of abuse of process "in
due course at its proper place in any subsequent trial." Id. at 307. The court found suppres-
sion of the evidence and its fruits to be the proper and the only practical remedy at the trial
stage "to cure the statutory abuse." Id. at 308. This is to ensure the prophylactic relief
envisioned by the fourth amendment and statutory safeguards of the Code. Hence, suppres-
sion would be permitted even though I.R.C. § 7609 now grants certain IRS targets the right
to notice and intervention. Id. at 308 & n.29. Furthermore, failure to institute judicial pro-
ceedings in order to stay compliance even though the taxpayers had knowledge of the sum-
mons would not bar suppression at trial. Id. at 310. Cf. United States v. Sand, 541 F.2d
1370 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Scully v. United States, 429 U.S. 1103 (1977)
(court upheld denial of motion to suppress because taxpayer had no standing to challenge
summons issued to his bank).
79. United States v. Rylander, 103 S. Ct. 1548, 1551-52, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
1 9300, at 86,754-55 (1983), rei'g 656 F.2d 1313, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9662 (9th Cir.
1981), may be an indication of the position the United States Supreme Court will take in this
matter. In Rylander, the Court stated that a § 7602 summons could be contested on any
appropriate ground, such as lack of control or possession of the summoned information. .d.
at 1552, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,755. However, Rylander could not raise that defense at a
contempt proceeding for failure to comply with the summons because he had not first raised
it at the enforcement proceeding. Id. If the Supreme Court applies this reasoning to the
John Doe summons situation, it may deny the taxpayer the ability to contest the validity of
the issuance of the summons at trial since that challenge was not first raised at the enforce-
ment proceeding.
Rylander can, however, be distinguished on several grounds: the taxpayer was trying to
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The third-party administrative summons and special John Doe
summons requirements were enacted by Congress to protect the pri-
vacy rights of the taxpayer.8 0 These requirements were designed to
serve as a substitute for the formal judicial warrant requirement with-
out which a search is normally deemed per se unreasonable.8' Yet
these administrative provisions do not provide the roughly equivalent
safeguards that they should in order to comport with the fourth amend-
ment.82 This is true because neither the unnamed taxpayer nor the
third party can assert that the IRS has failed to comply with these sub-
stituted administrative safeguards in defense of the target taxpayer's
rights. Barter exchange members are among those unnamed taxpayers
left unprotected when the John Doe summonses are directed to the bar-
ter exchanges themselves.
If a barter exchange is permitted to challenge the issuance of the
summons at the enforcement proceeding on its own behalf, it may as-
sert as a defense that the special John Doe summons requirements
under section 7609(f) were not met. Specifically, the barter exchange
may contend that the members investigated do not compose an ascer-
tainable group or class, 83 that there is no reasonable basis to believe
noncompliance with the tax laws has occurred, 84 or that the informa-
assert his defense at a contempt proceeding rather than trial; it was a different ground than
compliance with 7609(f); and the structure of the Code itself prevents the taxpayer from
being present at the enforcement proceeding to raise the matter.
80. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 35, at 3797-98.
81. Id.
82. See supra note 53.
83. United States v. Coble, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9506, at 84,818-19 (S.D. Iowa
1982) (respondents asserted as an affirmative defense that the summons was not directed to
an ascertainable group; the court found that members involved in transactions involving
more than $3,000 worth of trade units were an ascertainable group).
84. Id. at 84,819 (a significant amount of improper reporting by members of other bar-
ter exchanges and IRS discovery of four cases of improper reporting by members of this
exchange provided a reasonable basis to conclude there might be tax violations by members
of this exchange). See also United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., 644 F.2d 302, 306 (3d
Cir. 1981) (These barter exchange transactions are inherently suceptible to tax error because
no cash is involved and the Exchange keeps the only records of the transactions. This pro-
vides a reasonable basis to believe unknown taxpayers may have failed to comply with the
tax law when the summons is issued to determine the tax liabilities of exchange members.).
Accord United States v. Island Trade Exch., 535 F. Supp. 993, 996, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9317, at 83,811 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (IRS testimony that barter exchange transactions
are "inherently susceptible to tax error since no cash is involved" provided the sufficient
basis). See also In re Does, 671 F.2d 977, 980 (6th Cir. 1982) (the IRS' past experience with
barter exchanges gave it the requisite reasonable basis). But see United States v. Maxwell,
81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9378, at 87,028 (D. Nev. 1981) (A survey purporting to show
that members of other exchanges did not comply with the tax law may by itself be insuffi-
cient to establish a reasonable basis for investigating this exchange. However, when com-
bined with a statement by a part owner that members of his exchange might not be in
compliance, the requisite reasonable basis was present.).
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tion was readily available from another source.8 5
Whether or not it is allowed to challenge the validity of the issu-
ance of the summons, the third party may argue that the IRS did not
comply with the other three Powell requirements.8 6 The third party
may also argue that enforcement of the summons would be an abuse of
the court's process.8 7 Once the IRS has made a prima facie case by
proving that it has met the Powell criteria, the burden shifts to the tax-
payer to contest the enforcement on "any appropriate ground."88
One such appropriate ground is that the IRS actually knew at the
time it issued the summons the identity of the individual whose tax
liability is questioned; the IRS would then be forced to comply with
sections 7609(a) and (b) by providing the taxpayer with notice and the
right to intervene.89 However, the IRS has successfully avoided this ar-
gument and circumvented the section 7609 notice requirement in two
ways when investigating barter exchanges and their members. First,
before the enactment of TEFRA, one district court had held that barter
exchanges were not third-party recordkeepers and therefore the IRS
was not required to comply with the section 7609(a) notice provision.90
Because TEFRA specifically included barter exchanges as third-party
recordkeepers, this option is no longer open to the IRS.9 1
Second, the IRS maintains that serving the summons on a barter
exchange may come within the exception to section 7609(a) that applies
when the summons is served on "the person with respect to whose lia-
bility the summons is issued or upon any officer or employee of such
85. E.g., United States v. Coble, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9506, at 84,819 (S.D.
Iowa 1982) (Respondent asserted that the information could be obtained elsewhere and that
the IRS already had the information. The court found that it was too burdensome on the
IRS and the non-targeted members to seek the summoned information directly from the 495
members rather than from the exchange.).
86. Noncompliance with the Powell requirements would include issuance of the sum-
mons for illegitimate purposes such as harrassment of the taxpayers (e.g., to discourage bar-
tering), criminal prosecution alone, or fishing expeditions. See id. at 84,818 n.4; In re Tax
Liabilities of John Does, 541 F. Supp. 213, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) $ 9369, at 83,809
(N.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Island Trade Exch., 535 F. Supp. 993, 995, 82-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 9317, at 83,810 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). See also supra notes 27-39.
87. In re Tax Liabilities of John Does, 541 F. Supp. 213, 217-18, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9369, at 84,008-09 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
88. Id. at 217, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 84,008. See also United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964); United States v. Island
Trade Exch., 535 F. Supp. 993, 996, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9317, at 83,810.
89. Were the summonee not permitted to assert the defense that the taxpayers' identi-
ties were known, the IRS could easily circumvent the notice requirement of § 7609(a),
thereby preventing the taxpayers from intervening to protect their rights. United States v.
Pittsburg Trade Exch., 644 F.2d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Coble, 82-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 9506, at 84,818 (S.D. Iowa 1982).
90. United States v. Coble, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9506, at 84,819-20 & n.5 (S.D.
Iowa 1982).
91. See infra note 146.
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person."'92 Thus, if the summons states that the exchange's liability
rather than that of a member is at issue, the notice requirements do not
automatically apply and the members do not have the right to begin
proceedings to quash the enforcement or to intervene and protect their
individual rights.93 By claiming that the focus of the investigation is
the tax liability of the exchange itself, rather than that of the members,
the IRS has been able to use an administrative summons to require
production of barter exchange records as well as the names, addresses,
and records of members. 94 In so doing, the IRS has circumvented the
John Doe summons requirements under section 7609(f). 95 This inge-
nious method of defeating the protections of the individual's privacy
was upheld by a federal district court even though the IRS might later
use the information so obtained in its barter exchange research project,
or in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 96 The court based this holding
on the fact that a summons may be issued to gain data for IRS research
projects when the summons is also used for a purpose authorized by the
statute such as investigating the liability of the exchange.
97
Before the enactment of section 7609(f), the IRS could use a sec-
tion 7602 summons to obtain information about an unidentified third
party.98 Section 7609(f) was enacted as a limitation on this broad power
in order to protect unidentified taxpayers whose records were sum-
moned from third parties.99 A Florida federal district court noted that
[i]f the IRS can summon information relating to unknown taxpayers
from a third party in the guise of auditing that third party, then they
will never have to use the John Doe summons procedures again.
Therefore this court must give effect to the taxpayer protections Con-
gress created in 26 U.S.C. 7609(f).10
The Florida court would not allow the IRS to take advantage of the
lack of protection afforded the exchange members. The court held that
the IRS could obtain the names and addresses of the unidentified mem-
bers of the barter exchange without complying with the John Doe sum-
mons procedures only if it gave up the present intent to
92. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1983); United States v. Constantinides, 80-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9830, at 85,735 (D. Md. 1980).
93. I.R.C. § 7609(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1983); United States v. Constantinides, 80-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 9830, at 85,735 (D. Md. 1980).




97. Id. See also United States v. Island Trade Exch., 535 F. Supp. 993, 996, 82-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 9317, at 83,812 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (dual purpose of summons permissible).
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contemporaneously audit those members.' 0 An Arkansas federal dis-
trict court enforced a summons but included a provision that the mate-
rial produced could only be used for determining the tax liability of
the defendant.10 2
A recent decision of the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Thomp-
son, 10 3 is in accord with the Florida and Arkansas district court cases.
In Thompson, the IRS, pursuant to its Barter Exchange Project Unre-
ported Income Program, sought through a regular administrative sum-
mons the daily transaction sheets containing the members' names and
the amounts and nature of the transactions.' °4 The court held that the
John Doe summons requirements of section 7609(f) had to be met
when the undisputed facts showed that at the time the summons was
issued, the IRS had the intent to discover the identity of an ascertain-
able group of persons whose potential tax liability was at issue.10 5 The
John Doe summons requirements could not be avoided even though
the primary purpose of the summons issued to a third-party
recordkeeper, such as the barter exchange, was to determine the correct
liability of the recordkeeper. 0 6 The IRS had to comply with the John
Doe summons requirements if it intended to use the information
gained to investigate the members of the exchange. 0 7
The Sixth Circuit left unresolved the question of whether the John
Doe summons procedure must be used if the IRS subsequently develops
the intent to investigate the members' tax liability. This would seem to
be impermissable under the legitimate purpose requirement of Pow-
ell.10 8 The Arkansas district court's decision diminished the possible
use of this loophole, thereby giving the taxpayer greater protection. 0 9
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the Sixth Circuit in United
101. Id. at 83,562.
102. United States v. Massengale, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9305, at 83,694 (E.D.
Ark. 1980).
103. 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9244, at 86,581 (6th Cir. 1983).
104. Id. at 86,582.
105. Id. at 86,584-85.
106. Id. at 86,583-84.
107. Id. In Thompson, the Sixth Circuit implicitly overruled the holding in United
States v. Barter Sys. of Grand Rapids, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9707, at 85,547, 85,557
(W.D. Mich. 1982). The lower court in Grand Rapids, though specifically noting that
Thompson was pending in the circuit court, had held that when the basic purpose of the
summons was to examine the tax liability of the corporate barter exchange, it was merely
incidental that the names of the members would be forwarded to another agent who might
examine the members' returns. Id. The court held that the IRS did not have to comply with
the John Doe summons requirements when a dual purpose existed. Id.
108. See supra note 57-60 & accompanying text.
109. United States v. Massengale, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9305, at 83,694 (E.D.
Ark. 1980) (since the IRS was restricted to using the summoned information to determine
the tax liability of the defendant, it could not subsequently develop the intent to use it
against Gram, the owner of the records). See supra note 102 & accompanying text.
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States v. Barter Systems, Inc. 110 The facts in Barter Systems were
nearly identical to those in Thompson. 1 1 In Barter Systems, however,
the Eighth Circuit held that it was sufficient that the summons identify
one party whose tax liability was at issue, namely the barter exchange.
Hence, the court held that the IRS was not required to comply with the
John Doe summons requirements, even though such summonses result
in the discovery of other information that would aid in the identifica-
tion and investigation of unnamed taxpayers.112 Thus, depending on
the circuit, the IRS may still take the route of naming the exchange,
rather than the member, to avoid compliance with the John Doe sum-
mons requirements.113
A third-party summons may also be contested at the enforcement
proceeding on the grounds that it would violate either the fourth or the
fifth amendment of the United States Constitution. Under a fourth
amendment analysis, the summons arguably constitutes an unreasona-
ble search and seizure and an unwarranted intrusion into the privacy of
the barter exchange and its members. As to the fifth amendment, it
could be argued that the summons compels the barter exchange and its
members to bear witness against themselves in violation of the privilege
against self-incrimination." 4 Both arguments are addressed below.
The Fourth Amendment
The Right to Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment protects personal privacy and safeguards
the individual against unwarranted intrusions by the government."l 5 It
was designed to eliminate "fishing expeditions" and exploratory
110. 694 F.2d 163, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9698, at 83,515 (8th Cir. 1982) (reversing
the district court).
111. Id. at 164-65, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 83,515-16. The IRS selected Barter
Systems, Inc., from a telephone directory listing of barter exchanges and sought to investi-
gate it pursuant to its Barter Exchange Project Unreported Income Program. It issued a
summons to the barter exchange seeking the names and addresses of the members and
records of the members' transactions and the operation of the exchange. Id.
112. Id. at 168, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 85,820.
113. It would seem, however, that the IRS should not be permitted to assert form over
substance and avoid compliance with § 7609(f) through a procedural technicality. This stat-
utory provision was enacted by Congress as a means of ensuring that taxpayers are given the
minimum privacy to which they are entitled in substitution for the search warrant require-
ment of the fourth amendment.
114. See In re Tax Liabilities of John Does, 541 F. Supp. 213, 218, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9369, at 84,010 n.14 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (citing United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d
520 (2d Cir. 1968), the court noted that a district court may refuse to enforce a summons that
constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure because it is excessively burdensome). See
also United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523-24 (2d Cir. 1968) (summons may be
unreasonable because the records sought are not relevant to the investigation).
115. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1966); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
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searches for information and evidence." 16 To come within the shelter
U.S. 523, 528 (1966); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Texas v. Gonzales,
388 F.2d 145, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1968). The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The rights under the fourth and fifth amendments
are declared to be indispensable to the "full enjoyment of personal security, per-
sonal liberty, and private property;" that they are to be regarded as of the very
essence of constitutional liberty; and that the guarantee of them is as important and
as imperative as the guarantees of the other fundamental rights of the individual
citizen .... It has been repeatedly decided that these Amendments should re-
ceive a liberal construction so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or "grad-
ual depreciation" of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts
or by well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive officers.
Gouled v. United States 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
116. Texas v. Gonzales, 388 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 1968). This includes intrusion for
the purpose of tax collection. "Indeed, one of the primary evils intended to be eliminated by
the Fourth Amendment was the massive intrusion on privacy undertaken in the collection of
taxes pursuant to general warrants and writs of assistance." G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United
States, 429 U.S. 338, 355 (1977) (citing T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL IN-
TERPRETATION 41 (1969), and N. LAsSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTrION 51-78 (1937)). In Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885), this basic right was held to encompass protection against
the compulsory production of private books and papers of the owner of imported goods
sought to be confiscated for nonpayment of duties. To prove its allegations of fraud upon
the United States, the government sought to compel the claimant to produce an invoice for
29 cases of previously imported goods. Id. at 618-19. The issue was whether this was an
unreasonable search and seizure within the fourth amendment and also a violation of the
fifth amendment. Id. at 620-21, 630-34. Relying on Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State
Trials 1029 (1765), the Court stated that the protections of the fourth and fifth amendments
apply to all invasions on the part of the government and those in its employ of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the of-
fense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his con-
viction of some public offence-it is the invasion of this sacred right which under-
lies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment. Breaking into a house
and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible
and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be
used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the con-
detonation of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run
almost into each other.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 630.
The Boyd Court also noted that this type of unreasonable search and seizure may be
"the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitu-
tional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight
deviations from legal modes of procedure." Id at 635. Hence, the "constitutional provi-
sions for the security of person and property must be liberally construed [for] it is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon." Id.
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of fourth amendment protection, a two-pronged test must be met: a
person must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of pri-
vacy, and that expectation must be one that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as "reasonable."' 1 7 What one "knowingly exposes to the
public" is not protected by the fourth amendment.118 In contrast, what
one "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the pub-
lic, may be constitutionally protected."' 19
The general rule is that a search of private property without con-
sent is "unreasonable" unless authorized by a valid search warrant.120
An exception to this general rule exists under the "required records
doctrine."' 21 Under the doctrine, if there is a sufficient relation be-
tween an activity sought to be regulated by the government and the
public interest, the government may regulate such activity and require
117. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Owner-
ship, although relevant, is not alone sufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. All the circumstances must be examined to determine whether a person has a
legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. United States v.
Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 1149, 1154 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1980) (quoting
United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1345 (10th Cir. 1974)). For example, one may not have
a justifiable expectation that the people with whom he deals will not voluntarily convey
information concerning his transactions to the government. United States v. Barnes, 634
F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)). This is
true "even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed." United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (petitioners were found to have no expectation
of privacy in bank records under the Bank Secrecy Act). However, the California Supreme
Court held just the opposite, finding the that depositor made disclosures to the bank "for the
limited purposes of facilitating his financial transactions" and the fact that the bank retained
records of these disclosures did not diminish the depositor's expectations of privacy. Bur-
rows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 244, 529 P.2d 590, 593-94, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169-70
(1974).
118. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
119. Id. at 359.
120. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1966). The purpose of the
search warrant requirement is to avoid leaving to the "officer in the field" the discretion to
invade private property. "[B]road statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized
review, particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal
penalty." Id. at 532-33. Compare this concern with the "broad statutory safeguards" of
I.R.C. § 7609 (West Supp. 1983). In determining whether to create an exception to the gen-
eral warrant requirement, based on a standard of reasonableness, the need to search must be
balanced against the degree of invasion of privacy. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at
537. When subpoenas or orders are "authorized by law and safeguarded by judicial sanc-
tion," the inquiry as to reasonableness focuses on the particularity of the description of the
items sought. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v, Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946). In Wall-
ing, an administrative agency issued subpoenas under the Fair Labor Standards Act to a
corporation. The Court held that the probable cause requirement is satisfied when the court
determines the investigation is authorized by Congress, for a purpose Congress can order,
and the documents are relevant to the inquiry. Id. at 209.
121. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32-34 & n.42 (1947) (enunciation of the
required records doctrine).
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records to be maintained.1 22 These records are subject to warrantless
inspections by an appropriate government agency and thus are not pro-
tected by the fourth amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 23 However, this doctrine applies only if three conditions are
met:' 24 the government's inquiry must be essentially regulatory,125 the
required records must be of a kind customarily kept by the regulated
party, 26 and the records must have "public aspects" rendering them
analogous to public documents. 127 The applicability of the required
122. Id. at 32 (required records doctrine applied to records kept as a means of enforcing
the Price Control Act).
123. Id.
124. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968).
125. The required records are not essentially non-criminal and regulatory when directed
to a "selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities." Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39, 55-57 (1967).
126. When the taxpayer is required to provide information that is unrelated to the
records the taxpayer may have kept, the second requirement is not met. Id.
127. The fact that the information is desired by the government does not render it pub-
lic. Grosso v. United States, 398 U.S. 62, 68 (1968). "If it did, no room would remain for
the application of the constitutional privilege." Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57
(1967). Cloaking the request with statutory authority does not render public the information
sought, otherwise Congress could easily abrogate the privileges under the fourth and fifth
amendments with the stroke of a pen. Id. However, if records are required to be kept
pursuant to a valid regulatory program, they may have a "public aspect" and will not be
protected under the taxpayer's fourth or fifth amendment rights. See Donovan v.
Mehlenbacher, 652 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1981) (payroll records kept pursuant to federal regula-
tions come within the required records doctrines). Accord United States v. Silverman, 449
F.2d 1341, 1345 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1971).
One case held that records required by the government to be kept for tax purposes are
subject to examination by the IRS and are not privileged. United States v. Willis, 145 F.
Supp. 365, 369 (M.D. Ga. 1955). In United States v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 667 F.2d 510
(6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982), records that were required by statute to be
maintained and kept open for inspection by the government and the public were seized by
government officials from the coal company's office where they lay open on a table. The
court stated that these records were not public property. The records were private property
subject to public inspection. Id. at 518-19. However, they were knowingly exposed to pub-
lic scrutiny and the operators did not argue that they intended to preserve the contents of the
records as private. The court emphasized that this was a heavily regulated industry and held
that the operators' privacy interest in their records was substantially diminished by the statu-
tory rights of the public and the government. Id. at 520. Therefore, even if their interest was
not entirely without fourth amendment protection, the exclusion remedy under the fourth
amendment was inappropriate. Id. The court specifically reserved the question of whether
the fourth amendment would apply if the records were open only for inspection by the
regulating agency. Id. at 520 n. 11.
See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981), in which the Court held that pervasive
federal statutory regulations may sufficiently protect a commercial property owner's expec-
tation of privacy, rendering a warrant unnecesary, if the regulations give the owner notice
that his property may be inspected periodically. Id. at 602. In determining whether the
statute provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant, the Court found that
the statute 1) was specifically tailored to health and safety concerns, 2) was sufficiently per-
vasive and defined so that the owner was sure to be aware that he would be subject to
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records doctrine to IRS summonses is discussed below.
The Fourth Amendment and IRS Summonses
The taxpayer must assert an expectation of privacy in the material
summoned in order to be afforded the protection of the fourth amend-
ment.128 In many of the cases dealing with IRS summonses involving
banks as third-party summonees, taxpayers have been found to have no
expectation of privacy in the bank records. 2 9 Two reasons are given
for this result. First, under the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970,130 certain
records are required to be kept by banks; Congress "assumed" there
would be no expectation of privacy in these records. 131 Second, when a
taxpayer voluntarily conveys the information to a bank the material is
available for inspection by others, such as bank employees. 132 Because
inspection, and 3) provided a specific mechanism for accomodating the special privacy inter-
ests of the owner. Id. at 603-05. The government was required to institute a civil action to
prevent future refusals to inspect and the owner had an adequate forum to defend his pri-
vacy interests. 1d. at 604-05. See also Marshall v. Wait, 628 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1980)
(owner of a small family-operated quarry not subject to the type of licensing and reporting
requirements that would give notice of extensive federal regulation, thus he could not be
considered to have impliedly consented to warrantless inspections).
128. See United States v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45, 49 (10th Cir.
1974) (bank customers could raise no justifiable expectation of privacy in bank records and
therefore could not assert a sufficiently protectable interest permitting their intervention).
129. Id. Accord United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441-43 (1976); United States v.
Brown, 600 F.2d 248, 256 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v.
Trevose Fed. Sav. & Loan, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9492, at 87,560 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 485 F. Supp. 653, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
See also United States v. Stuart, 587 F.2d 929, 930 (8th Cir. 1978) (because the records
belonged to the bank, the taxpayers had no proprietary interest and the summons directed to
the third-party bank did not violate the fourth amendment rights of the depositor); United
States v. South Windsor Bank & Trust Co., 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9430, at 84,179 (D.
Conn. 1978) (taxpayer could not invoke the fourth amendment on behalf of the third-party
keeper of his records); United States v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9107, at 83,033 (D. Conn. 1979) (no expectation of privacy with respect to an entry
card of a safe deposit box). Cf. DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 85, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9233, at 87,492 (9th Cir. 1963) (taxpayer was not allowed to assert fourth amend-
ment rights of a bank and production of the requested material was required).
130. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730b, 1829d, 1951-1959 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
131. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1975). Yet the Miller Court, in
finding no fourth amendment violation of the depositor's rights, relied heavily on California
Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 54-55 (1974), which merely held that the fact that bank
records were required to be kept did not violate the fourth or fifth amendments. The Schultz
Court specifically reserved the question of whether the depositor's rights were violated by
the reporting requirements and whether the depositors were entitled to notice of the report-
ing of records. Id. at 70. The Schultz Court noted there was no indication of whether pro-
duction of records required to be kept could be compelled. Because it was a corporation, the
bank's fourth amendment rights were not violated. Id. at 71.
132. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1975). See also United States v. South
Windsor Bank & Trust Co., 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9430, at 84,179 (D. Conn. 1978)
(periodic inspection of bank records by a number of people for varied purposes is to be
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the taxpayer permitted others to see the materials, he is deemed to have
shown a lack of expectation of privacy in the materials. 133 The argu-
ment can be made, however, that the information conveyed is meant
solely for the eyes of certain bank employees for internal banking pur-
poses and not for the general public. Therefore, the taxpayer does have
a justifiable expectation of privacy.1 34
A different case arises when the third-party summonee is not a
bank and the Bank Secrecy Act is not implicated. The taxpayer's ex-
pectation of privacy is then determined by whether he has exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 35 Factors to be considered in eval-
uating the reasonableness include whether the information is required
to be kept and whether others have access to it.136
expected). Accord United States v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 1 9107, at 83,034 (D. Conn. 1979).
133. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1975).
134. Id. at 448-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Accord Zimmermann v. Wilson, 81 F.2d
847, 848-49 (3d Cir. 1936). The Zimmermann court stated that the taxpayer, not his banker
or broker, was the real party in interest. To say that the taxpayer had no right or standing to
prevent the unreasonable search of records dealing with his bank transactions was "to lose
sight of substance and rest on shadow." Id. at 848. The court also stated that it was the
information contained in the bankers books and not the books themselves in which the
taxpayer had a property right. Id. at 849. A search of these records would violate the "natu-
ral law of privacy" which "extends to the records of... [the taxpayer's] transactions from
the unreasonable inspection and examination thereof by unwarranted governmental
search." Id. Accord W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.7, at 409-17 (1978) (persons do have an expectation of privacy in such
records). Contra McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1937) (the information is not
the taxpayer's property).
135. See supra note 117.
136. See supra notes 117-26 & accompanying text; see also Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (because taxpayer gave records to his accountant knowing that much of
the material was required to be disclosed on his tax returns, the court found no reasonable
claim of an expectation of privacy).
In United States v. Torch, 609 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1979), an employee who from time to
time used a warehouse with no specific area assigned for his use had no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the warehouse and therefore could not challenge the introduction as evi-
dence of records kept in the warehouse. The court stated that one need not have the
exclusive use of an area to have a reasonable expectation of privacy, but an occasional pres-
ence therein is not enough. Id. at 1090-91. The employee had no interest in the records
themselves sufficient to create a legitimate expectation of privacy. Even though he had writ-
ten some of the records, they were not in his custody when seized and were records kept
during the normal course of business by the employees for the company's use. .d.
In United States v. Allison, 619 F.2d 1254 (8th Cir. 1980), labor union records were
obtained pursuant to a grand jury subpoena duces tecum. A defendant who was neither a
union office nor present at the union officer at the time of the seizure, and who claimed no
interest in union records, had no personal right or interest in them, and therefore no fourth
amendment ground on which to object to introduction of the records as evidence. Id. at
1258-59. The court also stated that a union official has the right to expect some fourth
amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures in the union office. Al-
though the statute permitting the Secretary of Labor to investigate violations of the Labor
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When the taxpayer has shown an expectation of privacy in the
summoned records, he or she may then argue that unreasonableness of
the scope of the search is a violation of his fourth amendment right.
Judicial protection has been found to be "particularly appropriate"
when an IRS third-party summons is involved.137 While the strict stan-
dard of probable cause need not be met to enforce an IRS summons,' 38
the individual's privilege against unreasonable search and seizure of
private papers is to be jealously guarded. 139 The summons must pre-
cisely describe the documents sought.140 It must be related to the tax-
payer's tax liability rather than some other potentially unlawful
conduct. 141 The summons may not be used for a "fishing expedition"
either to dredge up information about the return of some other person
not known to the IRS142 or to force a taxpayer to produce all his
records in an investigation the purpose and scope of which are deter-
mined only as it proceeds.' 43
Barter Exchanges and the Fourth Amendment
It is unclear whether the barter exchange itself will be able to as-
sert fourth amendment rights for its members directly or on its own
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act lowered the union's expectation of privacy with
respect to labor department investigations, the union retained some expectation of privacy.
Id. That expectation would not necessarily decrease when grand jury or FBI investigations
were involved. Id. at 1259 n.3.
However, the defendant's mere entitlement, as a union member, to access to union
records was not sufficient to raise a reasonable expectation of privacy in union records. The
member was not present at the union office at the time of the search, had no office there
himself nor any possessory interest in the records. Because of the "high cost to society of
suppressing evidence," protection was not extended. Id. at 1260. See Mancusi v. Deforte,
392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968) (union officer had a legitimate expectation of privacy in union
records in the office he shared with other union officials); United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d
1207, 1215 n.5 (7th Cir. 1980) (there may be a legitimate expectation of privacy in a business,
and the form of the business is not controlling even when more than one employee is in-
volved); see also Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1980) (fourth amendment protec-
tion applies to administrative inspections of commercial property, but such a property
owner's expectation of privacy differs from that of the individual homeowner). See also
infra note 156.
137. United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968).
138. Id. See also supra notes 55-56 & accompanying text.
139. See Hubner v. Tucker, 245 F.2d 35, 41-43 (9th Cir. 1957).
140. United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968). See also United
States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
921 (1968).
141. United States v. Richards, 431 F. Supp. 249, 252 (E.D. Va. 1977); United States v.
Anderson Clayton & Co., 369 F. Supp. 6, 7 (S.D. Miss. 1973).
142. McDonough v. Lambert, 94 F.2d 838, 841 (1st Cir. 1938); United States v. Conti-
nental Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45, 50 (10th Cir. 1974). See also supra notes 59-60 &
accompanying text.
143. McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1937).
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behalf, and in so doing protect the members' right to privacy. This will
depend first upon whether the material summoned falls within the re-
quired records doctrine.
I.R.C. section 6045, dealing with returns of brokers, was amended
under TEFRA to include barter exchanges and treat them as third-
party recordkeepers for the purposes of section 7609(a), effective as to
summonses issued after December 31, 1982. 44 Under TEFRA, the
Secretary can require brokers (including barter exchanges) to report in
a return the names and addresses of each customer and the gross pro-
ceeds and other information relating to transactions for their custom-
ers.' 45 The broker must also furnish written statements to each
customer stating the name and address of the person making the return
and the information regarding that customer shown on the return. 46
These records would not be sheltered by the fourth and fifth
amendments once the government has satisfied the required records
doctrine's three elements. 147 The IRS investigation would have to be
essentially regulatory and non-criminal under the first element. 48
Hence, the investigation would seem to be limited to the legitimate reg-
ulatory purposes of the IRS: ascertaining the correctness of any return;
making a return when none has been made, determining the liability
for any internal revenue tax, and collecting such tax. 149 However, re-
quiring records of selective groups inherently suspect of criminal activi-
ties is not regulatory and therefore does not meet the first element. If
the reporting requirement is directed at barter exchanges solely because
their transactions are "inherently susceptible to tax error,"'150 as is indi-
144. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 311(c), 96 Stat. 600, 620 (1982).
145. I.R.C. § 6045(a),(c) (West Supp. 1983).
146. Id. § 6045(b). See SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT ON H.R. 4961: THE TAX EQ-
UITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 245
(1982) [hereinafter cited as SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT]; see also Conference Report on
TEFRA of1982, STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH), Aug. 19, 1982, at 295. Barter exchanges are
defined under § 6045(c)(3) as "any organization of members providing property or services
who jointly contract to trade or barter such property or services." I.R.C. § 6045(c)(3) (West
Supp. 1983). The committee believed that barter exchanges should be treated like brokers
for the purposes of both the reporting requirements and third-party summons rules. SENATE
FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra, at 245. Hence, there is now a good chance that the tax-
payer members will at least know about the investigation when they are not named in the
summons, although they will not be able to intervene.
147. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32-34 & n.42 (1947).
148. See Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 68 (1968); Marchetti v. United Sates, 390
U.S. 39, 57 (1967).
149. I.R.C. § 7602(a) (West Supp. 1983).
150. United States v. Island Trade Exch., 535 F. Supp. 993, 996, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9317, at 83,811 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (IRS gave testimony that barter exchange transac-
tions are inherently susceptible to tax error). See United States v. Pittsburg Trade Exch.,
644 F.2d 302, 306 (3d Cir. 1981); see also supra note 84.
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cated by the purpose of the IRS Barter Exchange Project, 51 it can be
argued that the required records doctrine would not apply. If the bar-
ter exchanges did not normally keep records of the names, addresses,
gross proceeds and other data relating to the transactions carried on by
the exchanges for their members absent any requirement to do so, the
second requirement of the required records doctrine would not be
met.1 52 Finally, if the records did not have "public aspects" rendering
them analogous to public documents, the third requirement would also
not be met. The records would not become public documents merely
because the IRS sought them, or because section 6045 provided for
their reporting.1 53
However, if the courts analogize to cases in which banks are the
third-party recordkeepers, with records required to be kept under the
Bank Secrecy Act, the courts could hold that exchange members, like
depositors, can have no expectation of privacy in records kept by the
exchange. These records are open to view by members of the ex-
change, and are required to be kept under section 6045.154 In this situa-
tion no fourth amendment protection would be afforded the members
or the exchange.
As the fourth amendment right is a personal one, a barter ex-
change probably would not be able to assert its members' fourth
amendment interests at the enforcement proceeding. 155 Although in-
corporated and unicorporated associations, whether commercial or pri-
vate, cannot plead an unqualified right to privacy, they do have some
fourth amendment rights. 56
151. See supra notes 12-13 & accompanying text.
152. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 68 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39, 57 (1967).
153. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1967). Cf. United States v. Blue Dia-
mond Coal Co., 667 F.2d 510, 515-20 (6th Cir. 1981) (the two public aspects found in Blue
Diamond, records open to the public and a heavily regulated industry, are lacking in the
case of barter exchanges). Thus the barter exchange's records appear to retain their private
aspects and the doctrine should not apply.
154. See United States v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45, 49 (10th Cir.
1974). The courts could also follow United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365, 368-69 (M.D.
Ga. 1955), and find that the required records doctrine applies to records required to be kept
for tax purposes.
155. See United States v. South Windsor Bank & Trust Co., 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9430, at 84,179 (D. Conn. 1978) (fourth amendment rights are personal rights that may not
be vicariously asserted; fourth amendment protection extends to the person against whom
the search is directed) (citing United States v. First Nat'I Bank, 67 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ala.
1946)); see also Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1968); United States v. Hodge, 539 F.2d 898, 902 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977). But cf. United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293,
306 n.50 (D.D.C. 1980) (an organization, whether incorporated or not, may be able to assert
in good faith the rights of its members).
156. California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 66 (1974) (fourth amendment
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The cases involving unions' 57 seem to be the most analogous to
those concerning barter exchanges. Both types of organizations have
officers, employees, and members. Based on the union cases, barter
exchange officers, like union officers, should have a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the organization's records, even though such records
were seen and used by other officers. A member, even with access to
the records, would have an insufficient expectation of privacy to entitle
her to fourth amendment protection in light of the union cases. How-
ever, if the member were present at the time of the search or could
show a possessory interest in the records she might then have the requi-
site reasonable expectation of privacy for fourth amendment protec-
tion. 58 In addition, if the barter exchange asserts its own fourth
amendment right as an affirmative defense and contends that the sum-
mons constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure, the members may
be afforded some indirect protection.
If the members themselves are not permitted to intervene at the
enforcement proceeding or contest the validity of the issuance of the
summons at trial, however, and the exchange is not permitted in the
particular circuit to contest the validity of the issuance at the enforce-
ment proceeding, the targets of the John Doe summons are foreclosed
from claiming the statutory protection conferred upon them by I.R.C.
sections 7609(b),(f), and (h).:59 In addition, if the exchange is not per-
mitted to assert the taxpayers' fourth amendment rights at the enforce-
protection extends to commercial and business premises as well as private homes) (citing
United States v. Morton Salt, 388 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)). See Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 311-12 (1978); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353-54 (1977);
see also Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1967) (Court held that it did not matter
that the accused shared the office searched with other union officials. The accused could still
expect that only those persons and their personal or business guests would enter the office
and that the records would remain untouched unless their permission, or that of their superi-
ors, was given.). In In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1948), the
court distinguished a small family partnership from a corporation. The court found that
"while ownership and possession [of the documents and property in question] is shared, it is
nonetheless personal." Id. at 421. More than one person could exercise ownership and pos-
session with respect "to the same papers or effects. It is only where a group or association is
'so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot. . . represent the
purely private or personal interest of its constituents,' that the right is unavailable." Id. at
421 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1943)). The fourth amendment also
extends to corporations although the fifth amendment does not. See United States v. Uni-
versal Mfg. Co., 525 F.2d 808, 812 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975).
157. Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364 (1967); United States v. Allison, 619 F.2d 1254
(6th Cir. 1980).
158. See supra note 136.
159. Cf G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 355 (1977) (fourth amend-
ment was enacted in part to eliminate the intrusion on privacy through general warrants
used in pursuit of tax collections); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1885) (courts
are to be wary of such stealthy encroachments on these fundamental rights when a less
potent protection replaces a viable safeguard).
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ment proceeding, the only prophylactic protection available to the
taxpayers would be the lesser fourth amendment protection afforded
the exchange as an organization. The taxpayers would then be re-
quired to wait until trial to assert their own interests.
It is still an open question whether the exclusionary rule may be
invoked in a civil tax proceeding. The exclusionary rule is used to ex-
clude from a criminal trial any evidence obtained in violation of the
taxpayer's fourth amendment rights. 160 However, some courts have
held that information obtained by the IRS in violation of the fourth
amendment will be excluded in a subsequent civil tax proceeding. 161
Taxpayers can only assert their individual fourth amendment interests
at trial. Thus, the Supreme Court has refused to exclude evidence ille-
gally obtained by IRS agents on the ground that it was unlawfully
seized from a third-party not before the Court. 62 Moreover, the Court
160. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171, 175 (1968) (holding that the exclu-
sionary rule excludes from a criminal trial any evidence or fruits thereof seized from the
defendant in violation of the fourth amendment, although Congress or the state legislature
may extend the exclusionary rule and "provide that illegally seized evidence is inadmissable
against anyone for any purpose.").
161. The Supreme Court held in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1975), that the
exclusionary rule will not apply to evidence obtained in what the Court termed an "inter-
sovereign violation" of the fourth amendment. Id. at 454, 459-60. In Janis, state officials
had illegally obtained evidence which they later sought to use in a federal civil tax proceed-
ing. The Court reasoned that exclusion would not achieve a deterrent effect under these
circumstances. Id. at 453-54. Accord Black Forge, Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1004, 1013
(1982); Adamson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 327 (1982).
However, the Janir Court left open the question of whether evidence would be excluded
in a civil proceeding in the event of an "intrasovereign violation." United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. at 456. In Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1982), the court found
that the exclusionary rule should apply "in those civil proceedings where it has a realistic
prospect of achieving marginal deterrence." Id. at 314. The exclusionary rule was not ap-
plied in the civil tax proceeding in Tirado because it would not have served its deterrent
purpose; evidence seized by the federal narcotics agents was not seized "with the participa-
tion or collusion or in contemplation of use by" the IRS agents. id. at 308.
Yet, in Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986
(1969), evidence that was unlawfully seized by IRS agents for use in criminal tax proceed-
ings was excluded from subsequent civil tax proceedings. Id. at 584-86. Accord Vander
Linden v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 693 (S.D. Iowa 1980). In that case, the IRS, partici-
pating in the Drug Abuse Law Enforcement Program, obtained evidence from a taxpayer in
violation of the fourth amendment. This evidence was suppressed in the criminal proceed-
ing as well as in the subsequent civil tax proceeding. id. at 694-95. In holding that the
exclusion would operate to deter untoward conduct, the court noted that this was not only
an intrasovereign situation, but that the same division of the IRS that committed the illegal
search and seizure was the division seeking to use that evidence in the civil proceeding. Id.
at 697. See generally W. LAFAVE, supra note 134, § 1.5(d), at 90-95.
While the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the point, under Pizarello and Vander
Linden the members of the barter exchange may be able to invoke the exclusionary rule in a
civil tax proceeding when the IRS has obtained evidence in violation of the fourth amend-
ment right against unreasonable search and seizure.
162. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-33 (1980).
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will not use its supervisory powers to suppress the evidence although it
was established that the evidence was obtained in flagrant violation of
the law. t63
The Fifth Amendment
The Right to Privacy Under the Fifth Amendment
There are two basic principles underlying the fifth amendment.164
First, forcible and compulsory extortion of a person's own testimony to
163. Id. at 733-37. See also United States v. Kember, 648 F.2d 1354, 1365-68 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (defendant did not have standing to object to the admissibility of evidence seized from
a third-party; nor could the third party refuse to testify against the defendant on the grounds
that the third-party's fourth amendment rights were violated). The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), is an indication that the Court favors
contracting rather than expanding the exclusionary rule. The Court held that evidence ob-
tained in violation of IRS regulations that are not mandated by the Constitution or by stat-
ute could be admitted at the criminal trial of a taxpayer. Id. at 749-52, 757. The Court
refused to invoke the exclusionary rule and suppress the evidence. Id. at 755-57. However,
the Court in dicta noted the distinction between regulations and constitutionally or statuto-
rily created rules. Id. at 749-52. It does not appear that the Administrative Procedure Act
offers aid to the taxpayer either. The Court stated that the Act was inapplicable, in this case,
when the remedy sought was not invalidation of agency action but rather exclusion of evi-
dence. Id. at 754.
164. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution states in pertinent part:
"No person. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination
keeps the American system of criminal prosecution accusatorial rather than inquisatorial by
requiring both state and federal governments to "establish guilt by evidence independently
and freely secured" and forbiding them to prove through "coercion. . . a charge against an
accused out of his own mouth." Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414 (1966) (citing Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964)). One purpose behind this requirement is to preserve the
integrity of our judicial system by forcing the government to bear the burden of proving
convictions. Id. at 415. The justifications for the fifth amendment protections are outlined
in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964):
The privilege against self-incrimination registers an important advance in the de-
velopment of our liberty-"one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make
himself civilized.". . . It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble
aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial
rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminat-
ing statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair
play which dictates a "fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to
leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by
requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire
load," . . . our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the
right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life,"
.. . our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privi-
lege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the
innocent."
Id. at 55 (citations omitted). See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 35, at 3207 (House Re-
port), 3797-98 (Senate Report).
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gain his or her conviction is unconscionable and does not comport with
the American ideals of political liberty and personal freedom. 65 Sec-
ond, the fifth amendment creates a "zone of privacy," 166 and protects
this "private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and pros-
cribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation." 167
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a
purely personal one. 168 It was never intended to be used by a witness to
plead that his or her testimony might incriminate a third party even
when he or she was the third party's agent. 169 Thus, when business
records and papers are involved, the extent of the privilege against self-
incrimination will depend upon whether the material sought is held in
a purely personal or in a representative capacity. For example, the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not protect the at-
tempts of corporations or their officers to avoid production of corporate
records. 170 This is true even though the records sought are possessed
by the corporate president or other custodian and they incriminate the
corporate officer or relate to an investigation of the corporate officer.' 7'
165. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 629 (1885).
It is very certain that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself, because the neces-
sary means of compelling self-accusation falling upon the innocent as well as the
guilty would be both cruel and unjust; and it would seem that the search for evi-
dence is disallowed upon the same principle. Then too the innocent would be con-
founded with the guilty.
Id. (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765)). "And any compul-
sory discovery by extorting the party's oath, or compelling the production of his private
books and papers, to convict him of crime or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the princi-
ples of a free government." Id. at 631-32.
166. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
167. Id.; United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 (1975); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 327 (1972); United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967) (noting that "the
fifth amendment reflects the Constitution's concern for the right of each individual to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life").
168. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 (1975); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 327 (1972); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906).
169. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906).
170. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 196 (1946); United States
v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944); United States v. Sneeky Theef Records, Inc., 526 F.
Supp. 434, 438 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
171. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 205 (1946); United States
v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944); United States v. Sneeky Theef Records, Inc., 526 F.
Supp. 434, 438 (N.D.N.Y. 1981). This rule is based on the distinction between the individ-
ual and a corporation and the government's power to regulate the latter. United States v.
White, 322 U.S. at 700. See also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906). In Hale, the
Court compared the rights of the individual to those of a corporation, stating that the indi-
vidual "owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his
doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him." Id, at 74. He can only
be deprived of his rights, including those against self-incrimination and unreasonable search
and seizure, with due process of law and in accordance with the Constitution. Id. A corpo-
ration, on the other hand, is a creature of the state and its powers are limited by law. Id.
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It is unclear whether the privilege would apply to a sole proprietorship
or a sole practitioner, 72 or whether the privilege will apply to those
collective entities falling in between these extremes, such as partner-
ships and unincorporated associations. 73 The privilege does not ex-
tend to the production of records of a collective entity held by its agents
or officers in a representative rather than a personal capacity, even
though the production may incriminate those officers and agents. 174
The legislature has the reserved right to investigate its contracts to determine whether the
corporation has exceeded its powers. Id. at 75.
172. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974) (in dictum, the Court stated that the
privilege would apply to a sole proprietor). See also In re Grand Jury Empanelled Mar. 18,
1980, 680 F.2d 327, 336 (3d Cir. 1982) (subpoenas not enforced against sole proprietor on
fifth amendment grounds).
173. United States v. Kuta, 518 F.2d 947, 954 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014
(1975) (holding that the privilege did not apply to a law partnership when the partnership
books and records, rather than personal records, were subpoened because there was no ex-
pectation of privacy in records to which the partners had equal right of access and inspec-
tion). Cf. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87-88, 101 (1974) (there might be a different
result if a small family partnership had been involved or if there were some other pre-
existing relationship of confidentiality among the partners); United States v. Mahady &
Mahady, 512 F.2d 520 (3d Cir. 1975) (law partnership of four brothers required to produce
the partnership records, although they did not have to testify).
174. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699-700 (1944). The Court's reasoning was
that, when acting as representatives of a collective agency, individuals are not exercising
personal rights and duties and therefore are not entitled to assert their personal privileges.
Further, the organization's records do not embody an element of personal privacy because
they are not the private records of the individual and are open to inspection by other mem-
bers. Id. The Court stated that the state and federal governments need to have sufficient
power to regulate the economic activities of both incorporated and unincorporated organiza-
tions. Id. The Court believed that most of the evidence of wrongdoing by such organiza-
tions and their representatives lies in their records and documents. "Were the cloak of the
privilege to be thrown around these impersonal records and documents, effective enforce-
ment of many federal and state laws would be impossible." Id. at 700. The Court believed
that the framers of the Constitution intended to protect individual civil liberties, not eco-
nomic or other interests of organizations, since the latter protection would nullify appropri-
ate governmental regulations. Id. See also In re Grand Jury Empanelled Mar. 18, 1980,
680 F.2d 327, 336 n.14 (3d Cir. 1982).
The test set forth in White to determine when an organization may invoke the privilege
is:
Whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a particular type of
organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and
activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or per-
sonal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group
interests only. If so, the privilege cannot be invoked on behalf of the organization
or its representatives in their official capacity.
United States v. White, 322 U.S. at 701. The labor union in White fell within the test and
could not assert the privilege. The partnership in Beli met the same fate under an ex-
panded formulation of the test:
The group must be relatively well organized and structured, and not merely a
loose, informal association of individuals. It must maintain a distinct set of organi-
zation records, and recognize rights in its members of control and access to them.
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The privilege may not protect an organization's records, but it does
protect one's personal papers and effects. 175 Just as an individual
should not be compelled to disclose what he is thinking, he should not
be compelled to produce the thoughts he has set down on paper.176
Early cases held that in order for fifth amendment protection to
apply, there had to be a compulsion of self-incriminating evidence of a
"testimoniar' or "communicative" nature.177 Each of the elements had
to exist and the person asserting the privilege had to be the person com-
pelled to be a witness against himself.178 The privilege clearly extended
And the records subpoened must in fact be organizational records held in a repre-
sentative capacity. . . .[I]t must be fair to say that the records demanded are the
records of the organization rather than those of the individual ....
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1974). But see United States v. Hubbard, 650
F.2d 293, 306 n.50 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (an organization, whether corporate or noncorporate,
may be able to assert in good faith the privacy interests of its members).
175. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361, 377 (1911) (privilege exists even when a person's private papers were written by
another); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1885); see also United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694, 699, 701 (1944) (records must at least be in his possession in a purely personal
capacity since the historic function of the fifth amendment is to protect the "natural individ-
ual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records").
176. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 420 (1975) (Brenn.'n, J. concurring).
An individual's books and papers are generally little more than an extension of his
person. They reveal no less than he could reveal upon being questioned directly.
Many of the matters within an individual's knowledge may as easily be retained
within his head as set down on a scrap of paper. I perceive no principle which does
not permit compelling one to disclose the contents of one's mind but does permit
compelling disclosure of the contents of that scrap of paper by compelling its pro-
duction. Under a contrary view, the constitutional protection would turn on fortu-
ity, and persons would, at their peril, record their thoughts and the events of their
lives. The ability to think private thoughts, facilitated as it is by pen and paper,
and the ability to preserve intimate memories would be curtailed through fear that
those thoughts or the events of those memories would become the subject of crimi-
nal sanctions however invalidly imposed. Indeed it was the very reality of those
fears that helped provide the historical impetus for the privilege.
Id.
177. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
178. Id. at 761-63. When compulsion is present, the principle that the government must
procure evidence against an accused by its own labors is not satisfied. "[T]he privilege is
fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right to remain silent unless he chooses to
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will." Id. at 763 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 460 (1965)). See also Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918) (whether
immunity is extended does not depend upon ownership of the evidence, but rather on the
physical or moral compulsion exerted). Compulsion may be found when by the production
of evidence the witness is in effect forced to identify or authenticate the documents pro-
duced. Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144, 149 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971). "The
jury knows the books and records belong to the defendant and the entries he has made
therein speak against him as clearly as his own voice. This seems particularly true in a
prosecution for violation of the income tax laws." Id.
See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 n.7 (1975) (quoting Maness v. Meyers,
419 U.S. 449, 473-74 (1975) (White, J., concurring)) ("The purpose of the relevant part of the
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to the communications and compulsions of the accused in whatever
form they might take, including compliance with a subpoena to pro-
duce records. 179
In Boyd v. United States,180 the Supreme Court's focus when ap-
plying the privilege was on the individual's right of privacy.' 8' In
Boyd, the Court held that the compulsory production of private papers
and books compelled the owner to be a witness against himself in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment, and was also an unreasonable search and
seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. 182 In Fisher v. United
States,18 3 the Supreme Court changed its emphasis to a more mechani-
cal application of the privilege. The Fisher Court asked whether there
was compulsion of serf-incriminatory evidence of a testimonial or com-
municative nature, 84 holding that the fifth amendment did not bar en-
forcement of a summons compelling the taxpayer to produce his
accountant's workpapers because there was no compelled self-incrimi-
Fifth Amendment is to prevent compelled self-incrimination, not to protect private informa-
tion. Testimony demanded of a witness may be very private indeed, but unless it is incrimi-
nating and protected by the Amendment, or unless protected by one of the evidentiary
privileges, it must be disclosed."). When a compulsion of evidence is potentially incriminat-
ing, the courts may balance the public's need for the evidence against the individual's claim
of constitutional privileges in determining whether the evidence is truly incriminating.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762-63 (1966) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 460 (1965)). See also California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1971). The Byers Court
found the mere possibility of incrimination insufficient to defeat the strong policies in favor
of disclosure of one's name and address at a car accident. Id. at 428. The court noted that
society places some burdens on citizens, id. at 427, and analogized the disclosure to disclo-
sures required of taxpayers on their income tax returns, id. at 428. The Court distinguished
between regulatory and criminal statutes and whether the laws in question were directed at
"highly selective groups inherently suspect of criminal activities" or to the "public at large."
Id. at 429-31. This standard is strikingly similar to that used in the required records doc-
trine. See supra note 127 & accompanying text. While there is a substantial risk of self-
incrimination in the former group, there is not in the latter. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. at
430.
179. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966). See United States v. Blank,
459 F.2d 383, 387 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972) (court found the papers to be
non-communicative merely because they deal with business); see also Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 384 U.S. at 761 n.5 (privilege does not protect non-communicative acts though com-
pelled to obtain the testimony of others); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 (1975)
(information elicited on behalf of one person does not convert it into that individual's per-
sonal communication).
180. 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
181. Id. at 630.
182. Id. at 634-35. The Boyd Court also noted that with compulsion under these cir-
cumstances the fourth and fifth amendments' protection and function are nearly the same.
Id. at 630.
183. 425 U.S. 391 (1975).
184. Id. at 396-99, 408-09 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966)).
The Fisher Court noted that the fifth amendment protects privacy, id. at 399, but does not
confer the general privacy protection that the fourth amendment does, id. at 402.
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nation involved.1 85 However, the Fisher Court noted two instances in
which such self-incrimination might occur: when the compelled pro-
duction required the individual to admit the existence of documents, or
required him or her to authenticate such documents. 86 The Court spe-
cifically left open the question of whether the fifth amendment would
protect the taxpayer from producing his "private papers." 187 While
Fisher undercut Boyd, it did not overrule it. 188
Subsequently, the Supreme Court held inAndresen v. Maryland'89
that while the fifth amendment protects privacy, it does not protect
against every invasion of privacy.190 There must be compulsion within
the meaning of the fifth amendment.191 TheAndresen Court held that
the seizure of existing records from the business office of the defendant
by law enforcement officers pursuant to a legitimate search warrant did
not violate the fifth amendment. 92 The defendant was not compelled
to produce or authenticate documents. 93
Subsequent lower court cases are split regarding whether they
should follow the privacy notions of Boyd. One lower court stated that
business records are no longer protected under the fifth amendment. 194
Other lower courts still incorporate the Boyd privacy notions and have
found that compelled production of an individual's private papers from
the individual asserting the privilege, whether or not the papers are
business records, results in compelled testimonial communications in-
compatible with both Fisher and the fifth amendment. 195
185. Id. at 414.
186. Id. at 410-13. See In re Grand Jury Empanelled Mar. 18, 1980, 680 F.2d 327, 332-
36 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 475 (1976) (since petitioner
himself did not have to produce the evidence nor authenticate it, no compulsion of peti-
tioner to speak arose); Shaffer v. Wilson, 523 F.2d 175, 178 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding that,
while a warrant involves no "element of compulsion," a subpoena requires the person sub-
poened to identify the document in the subpoena by his own response) (citing United States
v. Blank, 459 F.2d 383, 385 (6th Cir. 1972)).
187. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 408. Further, Justice Brennan rejected any
inferences of the majority that the fifth amendment might not apply to one's private papers
and effects. Id. at 420 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also In re Grand Jury Empanelled
Mar. 18, 1980, 680 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 1982).
188. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 407-09, 414. See also In re Grand Jury Em-
paneled Mar. 18, 1980, 680 F.2d 327, 333 (3d Cir. 1982).
189. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
190. Id. at 477.
191. Id. at 472-73. See also supra notes 177-178 & accompanying text.
192. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. at 477.
193. Id. at 473-74.
194. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 626 F.2d 1051, 1054-55 (1st Cir. 1980).
195. In re Grand Jury Empanelled Mar. 18, 1980, 680 F.2d 327, 336 (3d Cir. 1982). This
court noted that, in order to be protected, the documents sought must be in the individual's
actual or contructive possession, cannot be prepared by or obtained from a third party, nor
seized from an office by investigators pursuant to a valid search warrant. The court also
noted an exception for records required to be kept. Id. at 336 n.15. The court in Interstate
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The Fifth Amendment and IRS Summonses
When the third-party recordkeeper, as defined in section 7609(b),
is a corporation, partnership, or in some cases an unincorporated asso-
ciation, it cannot assert the privilege on its own behalf because the fifth
amendment protection is a purely personal privilege.196 Furthermore,
because the privilege is said to adhere to the person, not to the informa-
tion that may incriminate him, the taxpayer and third-party summonee
may not assert the privilege vicariously on behalf of one another; the
taxpayer must be able to assert the privilege himself.197
The Fisher Court held that the personal nature of the fifth amend-
ment prohibits compelling a taxpayer to produce papers in his posses-
sion. 198 Under the Fisher analysis, the focus of the inquiry is on
whether the taxpayer has been personally compelled to do anything,
causing the applicability of the fifth amendment to turn on who pos-
sessed the documents at the time of compulsion or summons. The
Supreme Court has stated that possession rather than ownership bears
the closest relationship to the personal compulsion forbidden by the
fifth amendment. 99 The fifth amendment privilege is lost by the tax-
Commerce Comm'n v. Gould, 629 F.2d 847 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077
(1981), distinguished between subpoenas or summons procedures wherein the Boyd rule was
to be followed, and search and seizures pursuant to warrants wherein the Andresen rule
applied. Id. at 858-60 & n.22. Accord In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 632 F.2d 1033, 1044
n.23 (3rd Cir. 1980) (holding that the government cannot compel production of datebooks of
the defendant constituting wholly personal papers, without violating the fifth amendment
because the defendant was found to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the entries
recorded by him, rather than a third party). See generally United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d
1028, 1041-43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981) (setting forth the conflict between
the Fisher-Andresen and Boyd analyses).
196. See United States v. South Windsor Bank & Trust Co., 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1
9430, at 84,179-80 (D. Conn. 1978); see also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973)
(stating that the fifth amendment right "by its very nature is an intimate and personal one[,
respecting] a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes state
intrusion to extract self-condemnation"). See supra notes 168-174 & accompanying text.
Accord Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382-84 (1911); United States v. Meeks, 642
F.2d 733, 734, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9367, at 86,975 (5th Cir. 1981) (the claim of the
privilege is a personal one and does not extend to the activities of a business entity); United
States v. Beattie, 522 F.2d 267, 271-72 (2d Cir. 1975), modified, 541 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 970 (1976); United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 467, 472 (9th Cir. 1967).
Cf. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1974) (privilege does apply to the business
records of the sole proprietor).
197. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1973) ("A party is privileged from
producing the evidence but not from its production. . . . It is the extortion of information
from the accused himself that offends our sense ofjustice."). Accord United States v. White,
477 F.2d 757, 761, 763 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974).
198. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 397-98.
199. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 331 (1973). Yet, the Couch Court
adopted no per se rule with respect to possession. Id. at 336 n.20. See also Perlman v.
United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918); United States v. Silvestain, 668 F.2d 1161-64 (10th Cir.
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payer upon transfer of the documents in question from the taxpayer to
another, whether that other person is the taxpayer's attorney,200 ac-
countant, agent, or any other person.201
An exception, however, has been found when the taxpayer can
show that he had constructive possession of the summoned material.20 2
Constructive possession may exist when only the taxpayer had access to
the material, the transferee held the material only for custodial pur-
poses, or the transferee's possession was so fleeting or temporary that
the taxpayer never really lost possession.20 3 If the underlying purpose
1982); United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757,761-63 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872
(1974); United States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931, 934 (3rd Cir. 1969).
Possession of potentially incriminating documents is thus the necessary and suffi-
cient condition of the privilege. . . . Ownership, without possession of course does
not give rise to a claim of the privilege, for although the owner may watch with
regret the giving up of his materials to the government by their possessors, the
compulsion which underlies their surrender is not exercised against him ....
United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 468 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1967). However, possession is not
sufficient to activate the protection of the fifth amendment if the documents are held by the
taxpayer in his representative capacity for a corporation or partnership. Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361, 379 (1911). See also supra note 196.
200. In Fisher, the Court made an exception based on the attorney-client privilege when
records are transferred to obtain legal advice, but only if the documents would have been
privileged in the taxpayers' own hands. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 404-05. Yet it
does appear that this construction of the privilege might prevent persons from gaining legal
advice in an area where it is greatly needed, such as tax law. Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 342 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). For example, if the taxpayer's attorney ob-
tained the material without the taxpayer ever having possessed the materials himself, neither
the taxpayer nor his attorney could assert the privilege under the Fisher construction. See
United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, 763-64 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872
(1974).
201. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 397-98. It is questionable whether applicability
of such an important right should turn on which person happens to be holding the informa-
tion at the time of the summons. The protection of the privilege would seem to rest on
fortuity. If documents are summoned while in the taxpayer's hands, he may assert the privi-
lege even though he does not own them. If they are summoned after transfer to the sum-
monee, regardless of ownership, the taxpayer may not be able to assert the privilege. A
greater emphasis on the taxpayer's actual expectation of privacy would better protect the
taxpayer's right to privacy under the fourth and fifth amendments, which are to be liberally
construed. See id. at 424-28 (Brennan, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 397-98.
203. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 398; United States v. Guterma, 272 F.2d 344,
346 (2d Cir. 1959) (privilege upheld, records turned over only for custodial safekeeping). If
the transfer is temporary, the personal compulsion is deemed to remain intact. Factors con-
sidered include the length of continuous possession by the transferee, access to the materials
by others, dominion by the transferor, whether they are merely held for safekeeping by the
transferee, and steps taken to insure privacy. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 333-34
(1973). See also United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 872 (1974) (taxpayer never had actual possession, privilege denied); United States v.
Baucus, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9594, at 84,922-23 (D. Mont. 1971) (taxpayer retained
the right through constructive possession to revest physical possession of the documents
from his attorney). Cf. United States v. Silvestain, 668 F.2d 1161, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 1982)
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of the fifth amendment truly is to prevent compelling the physical pro-
duction of incriminating documents, then the constructive possession
exception appears to go beyond this purpose. This extension of the
possession concept appears to be judicial acknowledgement of the tax-
payers' privacy interest incorporated in those cases following Boyd.2°4
This narrow exception to the Fisher rule should be contrasted with
the Boyd decision, in which the Supreme Court noted that the seizure
of a person's private books and papers is not "substantially different
from compelling him to be a witness against himself."205 In those cir-
cuits still following Boyd, the summoned records may be protected if
they fall within the zone of privacy created by the fifth amendment.
20 6
Because of this conflict between the circuits, it is not clear to what ex-
tent the taxpayer can use the fifth amendment privacy protection to
(privilege denied because records not given to third party merely for custodial safekeeping);
United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir. 1971) (privilege denied); United States v.
Blackburn, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9696, at 85,259 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (taxpayer did not
have constructive possession when exhibit given to attorney for indefinite period and held in
his personal safe for over three months). See generally Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459
(5th Cir. 1969) (privilege upheld where documents transferred from taxpayer to accountant
for convenience of IRS agent).
204. See United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444, 452-54 (5th Cir. 1974) (issue framed as
whether the taxpayer had a sufficient legitimate expectation of privacy in the summoned
records to warrant the label constructive possession), reversed sub nom. Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 398 (1976) (finding this was not a case in which constructive possession
was clear). See also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 421-28 (Brennan, J., concurring).
205. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1885). See also Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. at 419 (Brennan, J., concurring); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1042 (5th
Cir. 1981).
206. United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444,452 (5th Cir. 1974). The taxpayer, knowing
the IRS was investigating his tax liability, gave his attorney documents and records given to
him by his accountant. The IRS summoned the attorney to produce the documents. Id. at
446. The court found that when the records were put into the taxpayers hands, they entered
the "private enclave" protected by the fifth amendment and retained that status upon trans-
fer to the attorney. The privilege was upheld. Id. at 452-53. In reversing Kasmir, the
Supreme Court held that the accountant's work papers were not the taxpayer's private pa-
pers and therefore would be outside fifth amendment protection even if they had been in the
taxpayer's possession. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 414. The Fifth Circuit subse-
quently held that Fisher was not inconsistent with the Boyd zone of privacy fifth amendment
analysis. United States v. Davis, 636 U.S. 1028, 1042 (5th Cir. 1981). See also United States
v. Beattie, 522 F.2d 267,271 (2d Cir. 1975). In United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464,471-72
(9th Cir. 1967), the court noted that the workpapers prepared by the accountant in his work
for his use embodied
information relating to [the taxpayer's] purely personal affairs, . .. plainly in-
tended for no eyes [except] those the [taxpayer] might designate. To pretend that
such papers did not. . . reflect matter personal and private to Cohen, and to treat
such papers as a source of information "independent" of [the taxpayer], would be
to condone the very "shifts and subterfuges" .. the government calls [the court]
to condemn.
Id. at 471-72.
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shield his or her documents from the IRS.20
7
Yet the taxpayer can only assert her own fifth amendment rights at
the enforcement proceeding stage if she is permitted to intervene. This
poses a problem for the unnamed target of the John Doe summons who
is not entitled to notice or to begin a proceeding to quash the summons
or to intervene. The problem is intensified when the third-party sum-
monee is not entitled to assert these rights for the unnamed target, re-
sulting in a lack of protection at the enforcement proceeding.
208
Although the third-party summonee could contest the violation of its
own constitutional rights at the enforcement proceeding, the third party
may not have an interest in doing so when it knows it is not the
targeted taxpayer.20 9 In such a case, because the taxpayer can only as-
sert her constitutional rights at trial, despite the taxpayer's interest in
the summoned information, the information might come into evidence
even though it was obtained in flagrant violation of the law.210 The
unnamed target taxpayer would be forced to wait until trial to assert
her own fifth amendment rights, although evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the taxpayer's fifth amendment rights might then be suppressed
at trial.21' Yet the target taxpayer of a John Doe summons has no as-
207. It is at least clear in the Fifth Circuit that incriminating papers in the actual or
constructive possession of the taxpayer written by the taxpayer or under his immediate su-
pervision are absolutely protected under the Boyd theory from production by summons re-
gardless of whether they are personal or business-related in nature. United States v. Davis,
636 F.2d 1028, 1042 (5th Cir. 1981).
208. See supra notes 170-171 & accompanying text. Hence, it is questionable whether
the protection afforded taxpayers under § 7609(f) is sufficient. United States v. Connecticut
Motor Club, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9141, at 86,143 (D. Conn. 1979), exemplifies the
taxpayer's dilemma. In that case, the taxpayer under investigation could not intervene to
oppose enforcement of summons because the court held that the recordkeeper was not a
third-party recordkeeper. Id. at 86,145. The court noted that Congress intended to protect
the privacy of the taxpayer through § 7609. Id. The court then stated that the taxpayer's
right to privacy was not involved because the recordkeeper's records were the ones sum-
moned. The summons was enforced. Id.
209. See United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292,306 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting that the third-
party is less likely to contest the summons where the taxpayer's interest rather than its own is
at stake); see also COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 35, at 3798.
210. See supra notes 160-161 & accompanying text.
211. See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966) (the Court stated that if the
government acquired incriminating evidence in violation of the fifth amendment, the tax-
payer's remedy would be to suppress the evidence and its fruits at trial rather than to bar the
prosecution); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 346 (1942) (when it appears in a fed-
eral criminal trial that evidence has been obtained in violation of the defendant's legal
rights, it is the duty of the trial court to entertain a motion for exclusion of the evidence and
to hold a hearing on that motion); see also United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292, 303, 308
(3d Cir. 1978).
See also United States v. Rylander, 103 S. Ct. 1548, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9300,
at 86,754 (1983). The fifth amendment "can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal,
administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, and it protects against any disclo-
sures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could
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surance that evidence obtained in violation of the protective provisions
of the I.R.C. will be excluded from trial.212 Hence, the judicial inter-
pretation of what constitutes constructive possession as well as the
characterization of the relationship between the taxpayer and the entity
from whom the evidence is summoned becomes quite important; the
taxpayer's success on these issues will determine the availability of the
fifth amendment privacy protection.
Barter Exchanges and the Fifth Amendment
Because the fifth amendment cannot be asserted vicariously, 21 3 the
unnamed targeted barter exchange member must rely on the ex-
change's ability to assert its own fifth amendment rights. Yet, it is un-
clear whether the barter exchange will be able to assert fifth
lead to other evidence that might be so used." -d. at 1556, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at
86,760 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45
(1972)). Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1965) (fifth amendment is available
outside criminal proceedings); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 77-79 (1964)
(the fifth amendment protects the state witness against incrimination under federal and state
law and the federal witness against incrimination under state and federal law); Counselman
v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562-64 (1891) (fifth amendment is not limited to criminal pro-
ceedings).
However, the holding in Rylander poses a threat to the taxpayer's ability to assert the
privilege. In Rylander, the taxpayer refused to comply with an IRS summons and then
failed to respond to an order to show cause why the summons should not be enforced. In a
subsequent contempt proceeding the taxpayer asserted that he did not possess the sum-
moned records but refused to be cross-examined on this fact, claiming the fifth amendment
privilege. 103 S. Ct. at 1552, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 86,756. The Supreme Court held
that the issue of the taxpayer's lack of possession or control of the records at the time the
summons was issued could not be raised for the first time at the contempt proceeding. How-
ever, the taxpayer could defend the contempt charge on the ground that he was then unable
to comply because he lacked possession or control. Id. at 1552, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at
86,757. The Court gave him the option of producing the summoned records, producing
evidence of why he could not presently comply, or going to jail; the Court refused to charac-
terize this as placing him in the dilemma of going to jail or risking self-incrimination. Id. at
1554-55, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 86,758-59.
This appears to be purely a matter of semantics, as Justice Marshall was fully aware.
Justice Marshall noted in dissent that Rylander was in effect held in contempt because he
invoked the fifth amendment when asked to testify at the contempt proceeding regarding the
location of documents. Id. at 1555, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 86,759 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
The target of the John Doe summons is placed in Rylander's position by the I.R.C. The
target cannot raise defenses at the enforcement proceeding because he is not permitted to
intervene. If at the trial the taxpayer attempts to assert the fifth amendment in defense
against production of documents and the RJylander rationale is applied, he will also be de-
nied its protection and be subjected to the choice of going to jail or producing evidence that
may incriminate him. Rylander may be distinguished in that it was a contempt proceeding
rather than a trial. It should be noted, however, that the identification or authentication
through production may be incriminating in itself. See also supra note 186.
212. See supra notes 77-85 & accompanying text.
213. See supra note 197.
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amendment rights on its own behalf at the enforcement proceeding.214
Its ability to do so will depend upon the characterization of the barter
exchange, and whether the material sought is held in a personal or rep-
resentative capacity by the exchange. Only those materials held in a
personal capacity would be protected. The privilege is not extended to
corporations, partnerships, or certain other unincorporated associa-
tions.215 Hence, those exchanges that are organized as corporations or
partnerships cannot invoke the privilege. However, if the exchange can
show that it only embodies "the purely private or personal interests" of
its members,2 16 or that it is an informal association of individuals and
the summoned records are really those of the individual members,217
then it will be able to assert at the enforcement proceeding that en-
forcement of the summons would violate the fifth amendment.218
If the targeted members of the exchange are not permitted to inter-
vene at the enforcement proceeding by virtue of their not being named
in the summons, and the exchange itself does not fall within either of
the tests noted above,219 then the targeted members would have no pro-
phylactic remedy. They would be forced to wait until trial to assert
their fifth amendment rights. At trial, a target taxpayer would be faced
with the difficult task of proving actual or constructive possession of the
summoned documents under the Fisher analysis in order to be able to
assert his own fifth amendment rights.220 Should the target taxpayer
fail, there would be no fifth amendment protection for materials sought
through an IRS John Doe summons. However, in those circuits follow-
ing Boyd rather than Fisher, the target taxpayer would have the lighter
task of proving that the materials sought fell within the zone of privacy
protected by the fifth amendment.221
Proposals for Reform
One means to help insure that the privacy rights of barter ex-
change members are adequately protected is to follow the lead of those
federal district courts that have strictly enforced the John Doe sum-
mons requirements when the IRS seeks to investigate both the named
exchange and its unnamed members. 222 By flatly denying enforcement
of the administrative summonses or denying the right to contempora-
neously audit the members of the exchange when only the exchange
214. See supra notes 196-97.
215. See supra notes 171-74.




220. See supra notes 198-204 & accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 195, 206-07.
222. See supra notes 100-07 & accompanying text.
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itself is named in the summons, the slender protection of the special
John Doe summons requirements would be insured.223
Members of the exchange would receive the minimum protection
to which they are entitled by law if strict enforcement were coupled
with permitting the exchange to contest the validity of the issuance of
the John Doe summons at the enforcement proceeding. The exchange
would then be able to prevent any exploratory searches when the IRS
has no reasonable basis to believe that a particular member or group of
members are not complying with the tax laws.224
Section 7609 was enacted to protect the privacy interests of taxpay-
ers by giving them notice and the opportunity to raise available legal
defenses. 225 The purpose of extending notice to the target of the inves-
tigation under section 7609 was to protect against the loss of the tax-
payer's rights by inadvertance or ignorance.226 The special John Doe
summons requirements were enacted because Congress believed that it
was impossible to give the targeted taxpayers notice.227 Yet, under
I.R.C. section 7609(a)(2), notice may be left with the person sum-
moned. It is likely that a third-party recordkeeper would know to
whom the records in a John Doe summons pertained, especially if it
were a barter exchange and the summons requested records of its own
members' transactions.228 In such cases, it is inconsistent with the pur-
pose of section 7609 to deny those taxpayers who actually receive no-
tice the right to intervene and protect their interests. As a solution, the
I.R.C. could be amended to require the third-party recordkeepers to
give notice to the taxpayer under investigation when possible. Then,
being entitled to notice, the taxpayer would have the right to intervene.
A further resolution of the taxpayer's problem would be to divorce the
notice and intervention requirements and permit the target taxpayers
with notice to intervene in the enforcement proceeding,229 regardless of
223. See supra notes 92-102 & accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 83-85 & accompanying text.
225. See supra note 35.
226. Id.
227. See supra note 41.
228. See supra note 37 & accompanying text.
229. Upon intervention, barter exchange members could assert noncompliance with the
four Powell requirements. See supra notes 53-56, 86 & accompanying text. They could also
contend under Powell that the summons violated their fourth and fifth amendment rights in
an abuse of the court's process. See supra notes 56, 87-88, 114 & accompanying text. To be
successful in their fourth amendment contention, the members would have to fulfill the Katz
test demonstrating a reasonable subjective expectation of privacy. See supra notes 116-17 &
accompanying text. All the circumstances would be considered in determining whether their
expectation of privacy was reasonable. See supra notes 116-19 & accompanying text. For
example, any records the members knowingly exposed to the public would not be protected;
those records they sought to preserve as private even in an area of public access might be
protected. See supra note 120-27 & accompanying text. Once a reasonable expectation of
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the source of the notice.
Conclusion
Recognizing that the taxpayer has the constitutional right to a pri-
vate inner sanctum encompassing the taxpayer's books, papers, records,
and other data, Congress sought to protect this right through the enact-
ment of I.R.C. section 7609. The courts have similarly given effect to
the taxpayer's right to privacy through the enforcement of the Powell
requirements. This Note points out, however, that the government has
been able to circumvent what protection is offered by section 7609, and
that the courts have narrowed the circumstances in which they will find
that the taxpayer has a reasonable expectation of privacy when admin-
istrative summonses are involved. In those jurisdictions following
United States v. Thompson,230 the taxpayers will be able to enforce
compliance with section 7609 at trial. However, in those jurisdictions
following United States v. Barter Systems,231 the taxpayers will not be
able to enforce compliance and thus will be denied the minimum pro-
tection to which they are entitled-that protection which was to serve
as a substitute for the protection of privacy under the fourth and fifth
amendments.
This Note suggests that the courts should not permit the IRS to
take advantage of the little protection afforded taxpayers under section
7609. The courts should prevent the government from using informa-
tion obtained against target taxpayers, such as barter exchange mem-
bers, unless it has complied with the John Doe summons provisions.
The Note also suggests that the courts should permit the target tax-
payer and the summonee to argue at the enforcement proceeding that
the government has failed to comply with the issuance procedures. Fi-
nally, this Note recommends that greater efforts should be made to ex-
tend notice to the targeted taxpayers, and that those who do receive
privacy was found, the members could argue the unreasonableness of the purpose or scope
of the search. See supra notes 140-43 & accompanying text.
When compulsion is deemed the crux of the fifth amendment argument, the capacity in
which the material sought by the IRS was held would determine whether the members
would prevail. See supra notes 199-201 & accompanying text. Yet upon proof that the
member had actual or constructive possession of the data summoned, the member would
prevail if the material also were shown to be incriminating. See Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
When the Boyd privacy analysis is used instead of looking merely to physical compul-
sion, the same privacy considerations as those under the fourth amendment argument would
arise. The member would have to demonstrate that the records sought fell within the zone
of privacy protected by the fifth amendment. See supra notes 131, 177-95.
230. See supra notes 103-09 & accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 110-13 & accompanying text.
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notice should be permitted to intervene to ensure protection of these
fundamental rights.
Lauren Watson*
* Member, Class of 1983.

